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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
1. Did Judge Quinn properly comply, on remand, with this Court's prior 
decision in McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146 ("McLaughlin F\ in ruling 
that he could consider options other than a fairness hearing - namely, disinterested 
directors' and shareholders' actions under Section 851 of the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act (the "Corporation Act") - for resolving the "nontransaction conflict[] of 
interest" situation at issue? 2009 UT 64, \ 36 n.6. This issue was preserved in the trial 
court. (See R2760, R2996, R3486.) 
Standard of Review: Whether Judge Quinn properly complied, on remand, with 
this Court's decision in McLaughlin I is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. In ruling that he could consider options other than a fairness hearing for 
resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest situation, did Judge Quinn overrule a 
decision of the prior judge in this case (Judge Hilder) in violation of the law of the case 
doctrine? This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See R3017-18, R3340-42.) 
Standard of Review: To the extent McLaughlin suggests that this issue should be 
reviewed for correctness (see Aplt.'s Brief at 2), he is wrong. A challenge to a judge's 
1
 As used herein, "McLaughlin" refers to Appellant Samuel R. McLaughlin; 
"Cookietree" refers to Appellee Cookietree, Inc.; "Appellees" refers collectively to 
Cookietree and Appellee Greg Schenk. 
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reversal of a ruling made by a predecessor judge, on the ground that the reversal violated 
the law of the case doctrine, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.2 See In re 
R.B.F.S., 2012 UT App 132, lj 8, 278 P.3d 143. 
3. Has McLaughlin asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim in this lawsuit 
based on the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders to ratify the 
nontransaction conflict of interest situation (collectively, the "2009 Ratifications"), and if 
so, did the disinterested director and shareholders breach their fiduciary duties to 
McLaughlin by executing the 2009 Ratifications, notwithstanding that such actions are 
expressly authorized by McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act? These issues were 
preserved in the trial court. (See R3003-04, R3359-62, R3375.) 
Standard of Review: Whether McLaughlin has a breach of fiduciary duty claim in 
this lawsuit and if so, whether the disinterested director and shareholders breached their 
fiduciary duties to McLaughlin present questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. 
See McLaughlin I9 2009 UT 64, ^ 14. 
4. Did Judge Quinn correctly determine that the 2009 Ratifications complied 
with the requirements set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act for resolving 
nontransaction conflict of interest situations and that, consequently, Appellees were 
2
 As noted above concerning issue 1, the substance of Judge Quinn's ruling - that 
he could consider options other than a fairness hearing for resolving the nontransaction 
conflict of interest situation - is reviewed for correctness. See In re R.B.F.S., 2012 UT 
App 1324 8, 278 P.3d 143. 
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entitled to summary judgment? This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See 
R2950-3018, R3315-66, R3487.) 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness. See Rawsonv. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^25, 20 P.3d 876. 
However, this Court need only determine (1) whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law, and (2) whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact. See Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383, 
1385 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes that are of central importance to this appeal are as follows, and copies 
thereof are attached as Addendum 1: Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850, -851, -852, -853. 
A copy of the McLaughlin I decision is attached as Addendum 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying dispute in this case involves a sale of Cookietree common stock. 
Specifically, on August 16, 1999, the Estate of Boyd Schenk, administered by 
Anna Schenk (Boyd Schenk's wife at the time of his death), sold 545,200 shares of 
Cookietree common stock to Greg Schenk (Boyd Schenk's son) (the "1999 Stock Sale"). 
(R3481.) 
The 1999 Stock Sale did not - despite McLaughlin's suggestion to the contrary -
give "Greg Schenk majority control of Cookietree, Inc." (Aplt.'s Brief at 10.) 
Greg Schenk became the majority shareholder (based on the total number of issued and 
outstanding shares) more than a year before the 1999 Stock Sale - on April 1, 1998 -
71794486.10061604-00002 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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when Boyd Schenk sold 818,000 shares to Greg Schenk. This transaction is not 
challenged by McLaughlin. Thus the 1999 Stock Sale did not result in a change of 
control of Cookietree; Greg Schenk was already the majority shareholder. (R2723-26.) 
Approximately six years after the 1999 Stock Sale, in November 2005, 
McLaughlin - a minority shareholder and former employee of Cookietree - commenced 
the instant lawsuit, in which he alleged that the 1999 Stock Sale was made in violation of 
certain transfer restriction provisions contained in an agreement among the shareholders 
of Cookietree (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement"), because it was technically not 
between "immediate family" members.4 
After the April 1, 1998 stock sale, Greg Schenk owned 61.04 percent of the 
issued and outstanding shares of Cookietree (R2723); after the 1999 Stock Sale, he 
owned 70.39 percent of the issued and outstanding shares (R2726). McLaughlin's 
argument that the 1999 Stock Sale "gave Greg Schenk majority control of Cookietree" is 
apparently based on the total number of "authorized" shares, not the total number of 
issued and outstanding shares. McLaughlin's reference to the number of authorized 
shares, however, does not make sense. Authorized shares in articles of incorporation 
simply refer to the number of shares that the corporation is authorized to issue. 
Everything in the Corporation Act that deals with a percentage of shares refers to shares 
outstanding, not shares authorized. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-721(l) deals 
with voting entitlement of shares, and is clearly based on outstanding shares: "[E]ach 
outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one vote . . . on each matter voted on 
at a shareholders' meeting." 
4
 The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement provides, in pertinent part: 
If any Shareholder desires or is required to sell any Shares, or 
if any Shares would be transferred by operation of law or 
otherwise, then the Shareholder (or his successor in interest) 
shall first offer the Shares to Cookietree, by written notice to 
Cookietree. 
(continued . ..) 
A 
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On May 17, 2005, to remove any question as to the validity of the 1999 Stock 
Sale, Cookietree's Board of Directors (the "Board"), of which Greg Schenk was a 
member, waived the application of the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale, as expressly permitted by the 1991 
Shareholders9 Agreement (the "2005 Board Waiver"). (R3481.) 
(. . . continued) 
In the event that Cookietree does not elect to acquire 
all of the Shares specified in the selling Shareholder's notice, 
the secretary of Cookietree shall, within thirty (30) days of 
receipt of a selling Shareholder's notice, give written notice 
thereof to the Shareholders other than the selling 
Shareholder. . . . Each of the other Shareholders shall be 
entitled to purchase that proportion of the shares available for 
purchase. 
Anything to the contrary contained herein 
notwithstanding . . . , each of Greg F. Schenk [and] BoydF. 
Schenk . . . (but not their transferees or successors in interest) 
may transfer Shares to no more than five members of such 
Shareholder's immediate family . . ., either during his lifetime 
or on death by will or intestacy. . . . "Immediate family" as 
used herein shall mean spouse, lineal descendant, father or 
mother of the Shareholder making such transfer. 
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with 
respect to any transfer either by Cookietree, upon duly 
authorized action of its Board of Directors, or by the 
Shareholders, upon the express written consent of the 
owners of at least two-thirds of the Shares then subject to 
this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned by the 
selling Shareholder). 
(R2803-07 (emphasis added).) 
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On the same day, the owners of approximately 90 percent of the issued and 
outstanding shares of Cookietree, as of the date of the 1999 Stock Sale, executed a 
similar waiver, again, as expressly permitted by the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (the 
"2005 Shareholders' Waiver"). (R3481-82.) (The 2005 Board and Shareholders' 
Waivers are referred to, collectively, as the "2005 Waivers.") 
In McLaughlin /, this Court determined that the 2005 Waivers did not violate the 
Corporation Act or Cookietree's bylaws, 2009 UT 64, ^[31 ("We disagree that the 
waivers were enacted without authority, were untimely, or were in violation of 
Cookietree's bylaws or of statutory conflict of interest provisions . . . ."), but that they 
"were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg Schenk, 
who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the 
shareholder agreement," id. TJ38. This Court made clear, however, that Greg Schenk's 
conflict of interest did not automatically invalidate the 2005 Waivers, and adopted new 
procedures for resolving the "nontransaction conflict[] of interest" situation.5 
Specifically, this Court determined that a nontransaction conflict situation, like the 
one at issue here, may be resolved by any one of the three options set forth in Section 851 
5
 In McLaughlin /, this Court determined that the Corporation Act did not apply to 
the 2005 Waivers because they were not a "transaction" within the meaning of the 
statute, which is why the Court referred to the 2005 Waivers as a "nontransaction 
conflict[] of interest" situation. 2009 UT 64, ^ 36 n.6; see also id. ^ 35 ("The waiver, as 
enacted by the board of directors, was a unilateral action by Cookietree, not a 'deal'; 
therefore, it is not subject to the conflict of interest statute."). However, the Court 
determined that the procedures provided in the Corporation Act for resolving transaction-
related conflicts of interest may also be used to resolve nontransaction-related conflicts of 
interest, like the 2005 Waivers. See id. f 37. 
A 
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of the Corporation Act: (1) disinterested directors may vote to ratify the conflict 
situation, (2) disinterested shareholders may vote to ratify the conflict situation, or (3) the 
party with a conflict may show that the situation was fair. Id. ^37 (emphasis added). 
This Court then remanded "for a determination of whether . . . [the 2005 Waivers] were 
fair." Id. *f[31. Importantly, this Court did not foreclose or prohibit Cookietree's 
disinterested director or shareholders (who are not parties to this litigation) from taking 
action, in accordance with the new McLaughlin I framework and Section 851 of the 
Corporation Act, to ratify the 2005 Waivers and thereby cure the nontransaction conflict 
of interest situation. 
Thus, following McLaughlin I, in the Board's December 2009 meeting and the 
shareholders' 2009 annual meeting (held in January 2010), each of Cookietree's 
disinterested director and shareholders (after full disclosure by Greg Schenk) took action 
to resolve the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers. Specifically, 
David Rudd, as the sole disinterested director, and the owners of a majority of 
Cookietree's disinterested shares, respectively, voted to ratify the 2005 Waivers (as 
defined above, the "2009 Ratifications"). (R3483.) As required by McLaughlin I mid the 
Corporation Act, Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009 Ratifications. (R3483-85.) 
On January 14, 2010, McLaughlin filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that the 2009 Ratifications were ineffective, and that a jury - not Cookietree's 
disinterested director and shareholders - should decide whether the 2005 Waivers were 
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fair. (R1876.) Essentially, McLaughlin argued, relying on the remand directive in 
McLaughlin /, that the 2009 Ratifications simply had to be ignored by the trial court. 
Greg Schenk and Cookietree filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
2009 Ratifications cured the conflict of interest identified in McLaughlin I as a matter of 
law, and consequently, there was no need to conduct a fairness hearing. (Rl882-85.) 
On September 9, 2010, Judge Hilder entered an order on the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment. (R2370.) Judge Hilder determined that he would simply ignore 
the 2009 Ratifications and convene a fairness hearing. (R2374.) Judge Hilder did not 
decide the precise form the fairness hearing would take, whether legal argument or 
evidentiary, but stated: "in the event there are no disputed facts, an evidentiary hearing 
would not be necessary." (R2373.) Greg Schenk and Cookietree petitioned this Court 
for permission to appeal Judge Hilder's interlocutory order, which petition was assigned 
to the Court of Appeals. (R2377.) The Court of Appeals denied the petition. (R2383.) 
Before a fairness hearing was convened, Judge Hilder retired and the case was 
assigned to Judge Quinn. On May 17, 2011, Judge Quinn held a status conference to 
discuss, among other issues, how the parties should proceed. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, Judge Quinn indicated that, after reviewing McLaughlin /, he believed 
Judge Hilder had incorrectly interpreted the remand directive: 
I'm certainly not going to take the same position that Judge 
Hilder did. The efforts to remedy what took place in 2005 
6
 McLaughlin has argued that he is entitled to a jury trial to determine fairness, 
notwithstanding that fairness is an equitable determination. {See R2446.) 
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have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case 
because I'm not convinced that that's the case. I think that 
the corporation can try and fix it. Whether they've effectively 
fixed it or not, I don't know, but I think that they can . . . . So 
why don't we invite [Cookietree and Greg Schenk] to file a 
motion for summary judgment that addresses all of those 
issues. 
(R3502atll.) 
On June 30, 2011, in accordance with Judge Quinn's instruction, Greg Schenk and 
Cookietree filed a motion for summary judgment. (R2705.) In the motion, Greg Schenk 
and Cookietree argued that, as a result of the 2009 Ratifications, a judicial determination 
regarding the fairness of the 2005 Waivers was unnecessary, because the 2009 
Ratifications effectively cured the conflict of interest identified in McLaughlin I. 
Greg Schenk and Cookietree further argued that to the extent a judicial determination of 
fairness concerning the 2005 Waivers was required, based upon the undisputed facts, the 
2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders as a matter of law. 
On November 17, 2011, Judge Quinn granted Greg Schenk and Cookietree's 
motion for summary judgment, in part. Specifically, Judge Quinn determined that: 
• Nowhere in McLaughlin I did this Court prohibit Cookietree's disinterested 
director and/or disinterested shareholders from taking action pursuant to the 
Corporation Act to resolve Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, nor does 
McLaughlin I explain why such action would be unavailable in this case. 
• He had discretion to consider options other than a fairness hearing under 
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act - namely, the 2009 Ratifications - for 
resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest situation. 
71794486.10061604-00002 9 
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• There is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
2009 Ratifications, or the content of disclosures made to the disinterested director 
and shareholders in connection therewith, and thus he could decide the validity of 
the 2009 Ratifications at the summary judgment stage. 
• The 2009 Ratifications complied with the framework for resolving nontransaction 
conflict of interest situations set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act, 
and thus completely resolved the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers. 
(R3481.) 
McLaughlin now appeals from Judge Quinn's order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees. McLaughlin seeks to have this Court reverse Judge Quinn's order 
and remand the case for a fairness hearing, notwithstanding that all of Cookietree's 
shareholders as of the date of the 1999 Stock Sale (with the exception of McLaughlin and 
his wife), all of Cookietree's current disinterested shareholders (with the exception of 
McLaughlin and his wife), all of the directors in 2005, and the current disinterested 
director have indicated, by their votes in favor of the 2005 Waivers and the 2009 
Ratifications, that the 2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders 
generally. No shareholder (or director), except for McLaughlin and his wife, has 
suggested otherwise. 
Essentially, McLaughlin is arguing that Cookietree's disinterested director and 
shareholders should not be able to decide for themselves whether the 2005 Waivers were 
fair (as provided for in the Corporation Act); instead, a jury should make the 
determination for them. This argument does not comport with McLaughlin I or the 
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Corporation Act. It should not be the province of the courts to second-guess (or ignore) 
such ratifications. Indeed, the Corporation Act is clear that if disinterested directors' or 
shareholders' action is taken (both were taken here) to ratify a nontransaction conflict of 
interest situation, the situation "may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award 
of damages or other sanctions" as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review: 
The Board's Post-Remand Actions 
On December 18, 2009, following McLaughlin I, Cookietree held a meeting of its 
Board. The Board members were Greg Schenk, Cookietree's President; 
Harold Rosemann, Cookietree's Chief Financial Officer; and David Rudd, who is not 
(and never has been) employed by Cookietree. (R2859 (Minutes of Dec. 18, 2009 Board 
Meeting, attached as Addendum 3).) 
Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation 
containing all of the material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers, 
including, but not limited to, the 2005 Waivers themselves, the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement, Cookietree's financial statements and other financial information, and this 
Court's decision in McLaughlin I. (R3483.) 
At the meeting, the Board discussed the 1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, and 
this Court's holding in McLaughlin I that the 2005 Waivers were tainted because 
Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest. (R2859.) Greg Schenk acknowledged the 
personal benefit he would receive from the ratification of the 2005 Waivers and from the 
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authorization and approval of a new waiver, and that such personal benefit created a 
conflict of interest. (Id.) Greg Schenk stated that pursuant to McLaughlin I, he would 
abstain from voting on any action concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver 
and the authorization of a current Board waiver. (Id.) 
McLaughlin has consistently argued in this litigation that Harold Rosemann has a 
professional or employment relationship with Greg Schenk that creates a conflict of 
interest for him in voting on any Board ratification concerning the 2005 Waivers, and 
understanding McLaughlin's position, Harold Rosemann stated during the Board meeting 
that he also would abstain from voting on the issue of the ratification of the 2005 Board 
Waiver and the authorization of a current Board waiver. (R2859-60.) 
Thus, David Rudd, as the sole disinterested director, after full disclosure by 
Greg Schenk, adopted the following resolutions: 
(a) ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver (the "2009 Board Ratification"); and 
(b) present waiver of the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 
Shareholders'Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale. 
(R2860, R3483-84.) Neither Greg Schenk nor Harold Rosemann participated in these 
actions. (R2860 (Minutes of Dec. 18, 2009 Board Meeting ("GregF. Schenk and 
Harold W. Rosemann abstained from voting on the foregoing resolutions and David R. 
Rudd voted in favor of the resolutions."))-) 
After David Rudd took the foregoing actions on behalf of Cookietree, all three 
directors then voted to ratify the actions taken by David Rudd to ratify the 2005 Board 
n 
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Waiver and to presently waive the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale. (R2860-61.) 
All three directors also voted to set the time and place of the 2009 annual 
shareholders' meeting and resolved that the matters of business to come before the 
shareholders included, among other things: 
(a) The present waiver by the shareholders of the transfer restriction provisions 
in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale 
("Proposal 1"); and 
(b) Ratification of the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the current shareholders' 
waiver contemplated in Proposal 1 ("Proposal 2"). 
(R2861.) 
The Shareholders'Post-Remand Actions 
On December 21, 2009, Cookietree's corporate secretary sent all of the 
shareholders of Cookietree (including McLaughlin) a notice of the 2009 annual 
shareholders' meeting (which was to be held on January 6, 2010), an infonnation 
statement concerning Proposals 1 and 2 (the "Disclosure Statement"), and a proxy. 
(R3484.) (A copy of the notice, Disclosure Statement, and proxy are attached as 
Addendum 4.) 
The Disclosure Statement set forth all material facts concerning the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, the transfer restriction provisions, the 1999 Stock Sale, the 
2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the circumstances surrounding this 
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litigation, and this Court's decision in McLaughlin L A copy of the McLaughlin I 
decision was provided to all shareholders with the Disclosure Statement. (R3484.) 
The Disclosure Statement stated that, in deciding how to vote on Proposals 1 and 
2, each shareholder "should consider, among other things, whether the 2005 
Shareholders'] Waiver and the 20[09] Shareholders'] Waiver of the Transfer Restriction 
Provisions are fair to the Company and the Shareholders." (R2874.) 
At the 2009 shareholders' meeting, shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the 
common stock of Cookietree were present, in person or by proxy, out of the 
4,124,650 shares issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the meeting. With respect to 
Proposal 1 - to presently waive the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale - 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor 
of the proposal and 400,000 shares (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted 
against. (R2881 (Minutes of 2009 Annual Shareholders Meeting, attached as 
Addendum 5.) This 3,168,200 shares did not include the shares at issue in the 1999 
Stock Sale, but did include Greg Schenk's remaining shares, pursuant to the waiver 
requirements of the 1991 Shareholders'Agreement. (Id.) 
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement requires that any waiver of the 
provisions thereof given by the shareholders be given by "the express written consent of 
the owners of at least two-thirds of the [s]hares then subject to th[e] Agreement 
(excluding those [s]hares owned by the selling shareholder)." (R2807.) Thus, to 
constitute a waiver by the shareholders, Proposal 1 needed to be approved by not less 
i / i 
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than two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares, including Greg Schenk's 
shares, other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale. 
However, because of Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, the shareholders were 
specifically told in the Disclosure Statement that Proposal 1 would only be approved if 
(in addition to being approved by two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares 
other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale) it was also approved by 
"shareholders owning a majority of the [s]hares . . . that constitute 'qualified shares' 
under the Business Corporation Act."7 (R2872.) For this reason, the vote on Proposal 1 
was tallied in two different ways: one tally including Greg Schenk's shares other than 
the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale; the other tally excluding all of his shares. 
With regard to the first tally, the Inspector of Election/Voting Judge announced at 
the shareholders' meeting that 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of Proposal 1 and 
400,000 shares (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against Proposal 1. 
The Inspector of Election/Voting Judge also announced that 987,000 "qualified shares" 
(shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 1 
and 400,000 "qualified shares" (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted 
against Proposal 1. (R2885 (Certificate and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting 
Judge, attached as Addendum 6).) Thus Proposal 1 was approved by the owners of at 
n 
"Qualified shares" are defined in the Corporation Act as "one or more shares 
entitled to vote on the transaction, except a share" that is beneficially owned, or the 
voting of which is controlled, by: "(i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting 
the transaction; (ii) a related person of that director; or (iii) a person referred to in 
Subsections (27)(b)(i) and (ii)." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-102(27). 
71794486.1 0061604-00002 15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares as required by the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreements and by shareholders owning a majority of the "qualified" or 
disinterested shares as required by McLaughlin I (the "2009 Shareholders' Waiver"). 
(R2885-86,R3485.) 
With respect to Proposal 2 - to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver - 987,000 
"qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk as required by 
McLaughlin I) were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (all 
owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against. (R2887.) It was noted at the 
meeting that Greg Schenk did not vote any of his shares on Proposal 2. (R2882.) It 
was thus resolved that the owners of a majority of the disinterested or "qualified" shares 
ratified (1) the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver, and (2) the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver (the 
"2009 Shareholders'Ratification"). (R2882, R3485.) 
Ignoring the foregoing facts, McLaughlin persists on appeal with in his erroneous 
argument that the 2009 Board and shareholder actions are virtually identical to the 2005 
Waivers, which were tainted by Greg Schenk's conflict of interest. McLaughlin's 
argument reflects confusion on his part concerning the nature of the 2009 Board and 
shareholder actions. The 2005 Board and shareholder actions consisted merely of 
executing contractual waivers concerning the 1999 Stock Sale as permitted by the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement. Although the Board and shareholders again executed the 
requisite contractual waivers in 2009, the disinterested or "qualified" director and the 
"qualified" shareholders also took action pursuant to the McLaughlin I decision and 
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applicable provisions of the Corporation Act to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and thus resolve 
Greg Schenk's conflict of interest. Such action was not taken in 2005. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Quinn correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and 
McLaughlin's arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
McLaughlin's first and primary argument is that McLaughlin I required that Judge 
Quinn close his eyes to the 2009 Ratifications and convene a trial to determine whether 
the 2005 Waivers were fair, despite the fact that Cookietree's disinterested director and 
shareholders had clearly indicated - by their votes in favor of the 2009 Ratifications 
(after full disclosure of all material facts) - that the 2005 Waivers were fair. Judge Quinn 
correctly rejected this argument. McLaughlin I specifically authorized (not prohibited) 
disinterested directors' or shareholders' action as a means of resolving nontransaction 
conflict of interest situations. Not even McLaughlin disputes this. And McLaughlin I did 
not explain why such ratifications would be legally irrelevant or prohibited in this case, 
as they had not occurred (or even been contemplated) at the time of McLaughlin L Thus 
Judge Quinn's ruling - that he had discretion to consider options other than a fairness 
hearing (namely, the 2009 Ratifications) for resolving the conflict of interest at issue -
complied with (not contravened) McLaughlin L 
McLaughlin next argues that Judge Quinn was bound by the law of the case 
doctrine to follow JudgeHilder's interpretation of McLaughlin!. McLaughlin 
misanalyzes the law of the case doctrine. While a case remains pending before the 
district court, the parties are bound by the court's prior decisions, but the court remains 
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free to reconsider any of its prior decisions, regardless of whether the judge has changed 
or remained the same throughout the proceedings. Thus Judge Quinn was not prohibited 
from reconsidering Judge Hilder's ruling. Judge Quinn operated well within his 
discretion and did not violate the law of the case. 
McLaughlin next argues that the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and 
shareholders to ratify the 2005 Waivers somehow violated the "duty of good faith and 
fair dealing" owed by directors and stockholders in close corporations. This argument 
fails for the simple reason that McLaughlin has not asserted a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim against Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders (or anyone else) based 
on the 2009 Ratifications. Such a cause of action was not pled in McLaughlin's 
complaint, nor has it been asserted via an amendment to the complaint, and McLaughlin 
cannot assert this new cause of action on appeal. Regardless, such a claim would fail on 
the merits, because Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders could not have 
breached their fiduciary duties to McLaughlin, as a matter of law, by voting in favor of 
ratifications (after full disclosure of all material facts) that are expressly authorized by 
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act, 
Finally, McLaughlin's argument that the 2009 Ratifications did not comply with 
the framework set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act, and that Judge Quinn 
should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, fails for the following 
reasons: 
• Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009 Ratifications - McLaughlin's 
argument to the contrary is factually and indisputably wrong. 
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• As the sole disinterested director, David Rudd's affirmative vote in favor of the 
2009 Board Ratification constituted a majority of the "qualified" directors entitled 
to vote thereon, and therefore the requirement of director action in a conflicting 
interest situation was satisfied. The Corporation Act expressly "permits a single 
qualified director to approve another director's conflicting interest transaction." 
Official Commentary to Corporation Act § 852(a) (emphasis added). Regardless, 
even if the 2009 Board Ratification were somehow invalid (which it is not), the 
2009 Shareholders' Ratification is independently valid. 
• There is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
2009 Ratifications, or the content of disclosures made to the disinterested director 
and shareholders in connection therewith. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Judge Quinn Complied with McLaughlin I in Ruling That He Could Consider 
Options Other Than a Fairness Hearing - Namely, the 2009 Ratifications -
for Resolving the Nontransaction Conflict of Interest Situation at Issue. 
McLaughlin argues that McLaughlin I precluded Cookietree's disinterested 
director and shareholders (who are not parties to this litigation) from taking action under 
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and also precluded 
Judge Quinn from taking any course other than convening a fairness hearing. 
McLaughlin is plainly wrong. 
The mandate rule holds that "when an appellate court makes a pronouncement on 
a legal issue, the lower court must not depart from the mandate." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc., 2003 UT 51, f^ 67, 82 P.3d 1076 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation 
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omitted). This Court, however, did not make any pronouncement in McLaughlin I 
regarding the 2009 Ratifications, because they had not yet occurred. The 2009 
Ratifications occurred after (and in response to) the McLaughlin I decision. And 
McLaughlin I does not explain why ratifications by Cookietree's disinterested director 
and/or shareholders post-remand would be (or could be) prohibited, considering the 
disinterested director and shareholders are not parties to this action. There is nothing in 
McLaughlin I or the Corporation Act suggesting, even generally, that ratification may 
only be attempted once, or that a corporation's disinterested directors and/or shareholders 
cannot act to cure a defect in a previous ratification. 
In arguing that this Court's remand directive must be observed "along with the 
circumstances it embraces" (Aplt.'s Brief at 14), McLaughlin focuses solely on the last 
sentence of paragraph 38 of the decision ("We therefore remand for a determination of 
whether the waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 
16-10a-851 . . . ."), but ignores that this Court also expressly adopted other procedures for 
resolving nontransaction conflicts of interest. Specifically, McLaughlin I states that a 
nontransaction conflict of interest, like the one at issue here, may be resolved, not just by 
a fairness hearing, but by directors' action to ratify the conflict situation, or by 
shareholders' action to ratify the conflict situation. See 2009 UT 64, <| 37. In adopting 
these procedures, this Court recognized that many aspects of corporate governance are 
unfair, and stated that "[t]he conflict of interest statute protects against such abuse, but 
still preserves the ability of close corporations to operate by not invalidating every 
transaction with a conflict of interest." Id. Thus, McLaughlin I specifically authorized 
on 
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(not prohibited) disinterested directors' or shareholders' action as a means of resolving 
the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers. 
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Quinn's determination that he could consider 
options other than a fairness hearing for resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest 
situation at issue was legally (and manifestly) correct. 
II. In Ruling That He Could Consider the 2009 Ratifications, Judge Quinn Did 
Not Overrule a Previous Decision by Judge Hilder in Violation of the Law of 
the Case, 
McLaughlin next contends that the law of the case doctrine prohibited 
Judge Quinn from considering the 2009 Ratifications, because Judge Hilder had 
previously declined to consider them. Judge Quinn, however, was not bound to follow 
Judge Hilder's interpretation of the McLaughlin I decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "[l]aw of the case does not prohibit a 
district court judge from revisiting a previously decided issue during the course of a case, 
regardless of whether the judge has changed or remained the same throughout the 
proceedings" Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, If 11, 216 P.3d 
352 (emphases added). This is true even when a second judge has taken over the case, 
because "the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office." PC 
Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, j^ 43, 273 P.3d 396 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Thus, the law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial power. Instead, "'the 
doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has 
ruled on them,5" but does not prohibit a court from reconsidering previously decided 
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issues. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 2009 UT 43,1f 11 (quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. 
D&K Mgmt, 2008 UT 73, ^ 26, 196 P.3d 588); see also McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 
978, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (court can change ruling until final decision is formally 
rendered; hence judge did not abuse discretion by rescinding prior decision to deny 
partial summary judgment). This rule tracks with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 
which provides that prior to final judgment, "any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.) 
Ignoring the foregoing, McLaughlin argues that a judge may only revisit a prior 
decision (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority, (2) when 
new evidence has become available, or (3) when the judge is convinced that his or her 
prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (Aplt.'s Brief 
at 15.) In making this argument, McLaughlin misanalyzes the doctrine of law of the case. 
As discussed above, the law of the case doctrine grants a judge discretion as to whether to 
reopen a previously decided issue, even if none of the above circumstances are present; 
but, if any of the above circumstances are present, the judge must revisit the decision. 
See IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT 73, f 33 ("There are, however, exceptions to the 
law of the case doctrine, which, if applicable, require a district court to revisit an issue it 
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has already decided." (emphasis added)). Thus Judge Quinn did not need to rely on any 
o 
of the above "exceptions" in order to justify revisiting Judge Hilder's ruling. 
Accordingly, Judge Quinn was free to revisit the applicability of the 2009 
Ratifications even though the issue had been previously addressed by Judge Hilder. 
Judge Quinn operated well within his discretion and did not violate the law of the case. 
III. McLaughlin Does Not Have a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 
Regardless, Such a Claim Would Fail Under the Facts of This Case. 
McLaughlin next argues that the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and 
shareholders to ratify the 2005 Waivers violated the "duty of good faith and fair dealing" 
owed by directors and stockholders in close corporations. This argument fails because 
McLaughlin has not pled such a claim and cannot do so on appeal. 
In his complaint, McLaughlin pled a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against 
Greg Schenk, arguing that Greg Schenk breached the fiduciary duty he owed to 
McLaughlin by terminating McLaughlin's employment and by executing the 2005 
Waivers. McLaughlin later moved to amend his complaint to add two new defendants, 
Harold Rosemann (a current director) and Gayle Schenk (a former director), and to assert 
his breach of fiduciary duty claim against them. Judge Hilder dismissed McLaughlin's 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk and denied McLaughlin's motion to 
o 
Even if this were not the case, Judge Hilder's decision concerning the 2009 
Ratifications was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice, as it does not 
comport with McLaughlin I or the Corporation Act. As discussed above, there is nothing 
in the Corporation Act or McLaughlin I suggesting that ratification may only be 
attempted once, or that a corporation's disinterested directors or shareholders cannot act 
to cure a defect in a previous ratification. 
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amend. In McLaughlin I, this Court affirmed both rulings. See 2009 UT 64, ffif 15, 39. 
Following remand, McLaughlin did not seek leave to assert a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty based on the 2009 Ratifications against Greg Schenk, nor did he seek leave 
to add new defendants (e.g., the disinterested director or shareholders who voted in favor 
of the 2009 Ratifications) and to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against them. 
Thus McLaughlin simply has no breach of fiduciary duty claim in this litigation. 
It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel 
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment or, for similar reasons, on appeal. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 
Tj 31, 48 P.3d 895. A plaintiff can only seek leave to amend by filing a motion in writing 
that sets forth the particular grounds and order sought, a memorandum of points and 
authorities, and a proposed amended complaint. See id ^ 57-59; see also Coroles v. 
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, Iffi 42-45, 79 P.3d 974. Here, following McLaughlin I, 
McLaughlin did not file a motion to amend to assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim (or 
any other claim) based on the 2009 Ratifications against any existing or potential 
defendant. Thus this Court should not consider such a claim on appeal. 
Even if McLaughlin had sought permission to amend his complaint to assert a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty (which he did not), such a claim would have been 
futile. McLaughlin cannot assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against 
Greg Schenk based on the 2009 Ratifications, because Greg Schenk did not vote in favor 
of the Ratifications. McLaughlin could not assert such a claim against any of the other 
directors or shareholders of Cookietree, because they are not parties to this action. 
""M 
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Finally, McLaughlin could not assert such a claim against Cookietree, as distinct from its 
officers and directors, because corporations generally do not owe fiduciary duties to their 
shareholders. See, e.g., Small v. Sussman, 713 NJE.2d 1216, 1221 (111. App. Ct. 1999) 
("[T]he circuit court also correctly dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim as to [the 
corporate defendant] on the independent grounds that a corporation - as distinct from its 
officers and directors - does not owe a duty to shareholders. That holding is black letter 
law in Illinois/5); Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (federal 
common law; "[I]t is well established that a corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its 
shareholders, nor can it be held vicariously liable for the alleged breaches of its officers 
and directors" (citation omitted)); Onex Food Servs., Inc. v. Grieser, 93 civ. 0218 & 94 
civ. 3063, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2797, at *23-34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1996) (Delaware 
law; "corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders nor may it be held 
vicariously liable for breaches of fiduciary duty committed by its officers"); Burcham v. 
Unison Bancorp, Inc., 11 P.3d 130, 146-47 (Kan. 2003) (Kansas law; corporation owes 
no fiduciary duty to shareholders). 
Even if this Court were somehow to conclude that McLaughlin has a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the director and shareholders who voted in favor of the 2009 
Ratifications (even though they are not parties to this lawsuit), such a claim fails on the 
merits. Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders could not have breached 
their fiduciary duties to McLaughlin, as a matter of law, by effectuating ratifications 
(after full disclosure of all material facts) that are expressly authorized by McLaughlin I 
and Section 851 of the Corporation Act. Rarely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary 
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duty on the part of corporate directors or shareholders to take action expressly authorized 
by Utah law. And McLaughlin's appeal brief is devoid of any explanation as to how the 
2009 Ratifications constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by anyone. McLaughlin merely 
states that the 2009 Ratifications "prevented him] from getting his fairness hearing." 
(Aplt.'s Brief at 19.) However, the 2009 Ratifications had the same purpose and effect of 
a fairness hearing: to resolve the nontransaction conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 
Waivers. 
Further, Utah's business judgment rule precludes a cause of action for negligence 
or breach of fiduciary duty against directors and shareholders for informed decisions 
made in good faith. See, e.g., FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leather by Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 
1334 (Utah 1979) ("If. . . directors, acting in good faith, and with reasonable care, skill, 
and diligence, nevertheless fall into a mistake, either of law or fact, they will not be liable 
for the consequences of such mistake." (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphases 
omitted)). McLaughlin has failed to establish that the disinterested director and 
shareholders who voted in favor of the 2009 Ratifications were not fully informed or did 
not act in good faith. 
In sum, McLaughlin has not asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the 
2009 Ratifications and, regardless, under the facts of this case, such a claim would fail as 
a matter of law. 
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IV, Judge Quinn Correctly Determined That the 2009 Ratifications Comply with 
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act and That, Consequently, Appellees 
Are Entitled to Summary Judgment. 
McLaughlin argues that Judge Quinn erred in determining that the 2009 
Ratifications comply with McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act for three 
reasons: (1) according to McLaughlin, Greg Schenk participated in the 2009 
Ratifications, (2) only one director (David Rudd) voted in favor of the 2009 Board 
Ratification, and (3) there are material issues of fact concerning the disclosures made to 
the disinterested director and shareholders in connection with the 2009 Ratifications that 
preclude summary judgment. As explained below, Judge Quinn correctly rejected each 
of these arguments. 
A, Greg Schenk Did Not Participate in the 2009 Ratifications. 
In arguing that Greg Schenk somehow "participated]" in the 2009 Ratifications 
(Aplt.'s Brief at 24), McLaughlin focuses solely on the fact that Greg Schenk voted in 
favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver (not the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification). 
Greg Schenk did vote in favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver because his vote was 
required by the contractual provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement. However, 
McLaughlin ignores the fact that, because of Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, the 
shareholders were specifically told in the Disclosure Statement that the waiver would 
only be approved if (in addition to being approved by two-thirds of all of the issued and 
outstanding shares other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale) it was also 
approved by shareholders owning a majority of the shares that constitute "qualified 
shares" under the Corporation Act. As noted above, the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver was, 
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in fact, approved by the owners of at least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding 
shares as required by the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements and hy shareholders owning a 
majority of the "qualified" or disinterested shares as required by McLaughlin I. These 
facts are not disputed by McLaughlin on appeal, and they were not disputed by him in the 
trial court. 
McLaughlin also ignores another - and more important - undisputed fact: the 
2009 Shareholders' Waiver simply was not required to resolve the conflict of interest that 
contaminated the 2005 Waivers, only the 2009 Board Ratification or the 2009 
Shareholders' Ratification was required, and Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009 
Ratifications. It is undisputed that the 2009 Board Ratification (the action to ratify the 
2005 Board Waiver) was undertaken by David Rudd, as the sole disinterested or 
"qualified" director. Greg Schenk did not participate in this action. It is also undisputed 
that the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification (the action to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' 
Waiver) was undertaken by the disinterested or "qualified" shareholders. 987,000 
"qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk as required by 
McLaughlin I) were voted in favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification and 400,000 
"qualified shares" (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against. It was 
specifically noted at the shareholders' meeting that Greg Schenk did not vote any of his 
shares on the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification.9 
9
 McLaughlin has previously suggested that Greg Schenk should not have even 
been present at the shareholders' annual meeting. There is no support for such an 
argument under Utah law. The Corporation Act clearly provides that shareholders' 
(continued. . .) 
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In sum, although McLaughlin correctly notes that this Court stated in 
McLaughlin I that the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement "failed . . . to foresee the possible 
conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate shareholder and votes to waive 
the restrictions on share transfers," McLaughlin I, 2009 UT 64, ^38, he is wrong that 
"the only way to resolve [this problem] is a . . . fairness hearing" (Aplt.'s Brief at 24). 
McLaughlin I clearly states that such a conflict situation can be resolved by "the vote of 
disinterested board members or disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction." 2009 
UT 64, Tf 37. Thus, new Board and shareholder waivers were not required in order to 
cure the conflict of interest at issue - although both the disinterested director and the 
disinterested shareholders executed new waivers here - all that was required was a vote 
of the disinterested director or a vote of the disinterested shareholders to ratify the 2005 
Waivers. Both votes were undertaken here, and it is undisputed that Greg Schenk did not 
participate in either of them, nor was his vote required for such ratifications. 
B. The 2009 Board Ratification Was Approved by the Sole Disinterested 
or "Qualified" Director and Is Therefore Valid, 
With regard to the 2009 Board Ratification, only the "qualified" or disinterested 
director, i.e., David Rudd, acknowledged full disclosure by Greg Schenk of his conflict of 
interest and voted to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver. McLaughlin argues that this action is 
(. . . continued) 
action to ratify a transaction "is not affected by the presence of holders of, or the voting 
of, shares that are not qualified shares." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853(2) (emphases 
added). Thus the Corporation Act clearly contemplates that Greg Schenk could attend 
the shareholders'meeting. 
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invalid because Cookietree's bylaws state that "the act of the majority of the directors 
present . . . shall . . . be the act of the Board," and that since only David Rudd voted to 
ratify the 2005 Board Waiver, there was no majority. (Aplt.'s Brief at 25.) McLaughlin 
misunderstands the requirements for directors' action concerning a conflict of interest 
situation under Utah law. 
The specific requirements for directors' action concerning a conflicted transaction 
(or nontransaction, as is the case here) are set forth in Section 852 of the Corporation Act. 
This section provides its own requirement for quorums and director action, separate and 
distinct from those applying to the standard situation. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-824 with § 16-10a-852. Section 852 provides that "a quorum for purposes of 
action that complies with this section" is a "majority of the qualified directors on the 
board of directors," and that director's action is taken if there is the affirmative vote of 
the majority of those qualified directors. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852(2)-(3).10 
Importantly, the Corporation Act "permits a single qualified director to approve another 
director's conflicting interest transaction." Official Commentary to Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act § 852(a) (emphasis added). * 
A "qualified director" is defined as "any director who does not have either a 
conflicting interest respecting the transaction, or a familial, financial, professional, or 
employment relationship with a second director who does have a conflicting interest 
respecting the transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be 
expected to exert an influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the 
transaction." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(3). 
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At the time of the 2009 Board actions at issue, there were three members of 
Cookietree's Board: Greg Schenk, Harold Rosemann, and David Rudd. In 
McLaughlin /, this Court held that Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest respecting the 
2005 Waivers. Further, as noted above, McLaughlin has argued from the inception of 
this litigation that Harold Rosemann has a professional or employment relationship with 
Greg Schenk that creates a conflict of interest for him respecting the 2005 Waivers. 
Thus, under the circumstances presented here, the only "qualified director" was 
David Rudd (who is not, and never has been, employed by Cookietree). McLaughlin has 
never argued, and does not argue in this appeal, that David Rudd has a conflict of interest 
respecting the 2005 Waivers or the 1999 Stock Sale, nor could he. Because 
David Rudd's affirmative vote on the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification constituted a 
majority of the "qualified" directors entitled to vote thereon, the requirement of director 
action in a conflicting interest situation was satisfied and the actions were valid under the 
framework adopted in McLaughlin I as a matter of law. 
McLaughlin made the same argument to this Court in McLaughlin L Having 
argued throughout this case that Harold Rosemann has a conflict of interest, McLaughlin 
should be estopped from making a different argument now. 
Even if Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann had voted concerning the 2009 
Board waiver and Ratification, which is not correct, the framework adopted by this Court 
in McLaughlin I requires that the presence and vote (had they voted) of Greg Schenk and 
Harold Rosemann simply be ignored. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852(3) ("Directors' 
action that otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence or vote of 
a director who is not a qualified director." (emphasis added)). 
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While the statutory framework adopted by this Court explicitly provides how to 
treat interested directors for quorum and voting purposes (as discussed above), 
Cookietree's bylaws are silent on the subject. However, even if the quorum and voting 
requirements of the bylaws must be met in addition to the procedures adopted by this 
Court for valid Board action respecting a conflict of interest situation, all requirements of 
the bylaws were satisfied through ratification in this case. McLaughlin conveniently 
ignores that all three directors voted to ratify the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification 
adopted by the sole disinterested director, David Rudd. The vote by David Rudd acting 
as the sole disinterested director was necessary to satisfy the procedures adopted in 
McLaughlin /, while ratification of that action by all three directors additionally satisfied 
the requirement in Cookietree's bylaws (to the extent there is such a requirement in a 
conflict of interest situation) for a vote of the majority of directors present. 
In sum, the 2009 Board actions of the disinterested director (David Rudd) to waive 
the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock 
Sale and to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver, and the entire Board's action to ratify the 
disinterested director's waiver and ratification are valid under Utah law. Judge Quinn 
correctly determined that these actions satisfied the requirements of McLaughlin /, the 
Corporation Act, and Cookietree's bylaws as a matter of law. 
13
 McLaughlin suggests that the procedures in the bylaws are to be strictly 
enforced in order to protect the interests of the shareholders. He fails to explain, 
however, how requiring the vote of directors with conflicting interests would be in the 
best interest of the shareholders. 
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It is important to note that, even if the 2009 Board Ratification were somehow 
invalid (which it is not), the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification is independently valid. 
C. Judge Quinn Correctly Determined That There Is No Disputed Issue of 
Material Fact Concerning the Disclosures Made in Connection with the 
2009 Ratifications-
This is not a case where there is any dispute about the timing or circumstances 
surrounding the 2009 Ratifications or the content of disclosures made in connection 
therewith. However, McLaughlin attempts to manufacture a triable issue by disputing 
two findings made by Judge Quinn. First, McLaughlin disputes Judge Quinn5s finding 
that, prior to the 2009 Board meeting, David Rudd "analyzed and reviewed 
documentation concerning all of the material facts concerning the [1999] Stock Sale and 
the 2005 Waivers." (Aplt.'s Brief at 20.) Second, McLaughlin disputes Judge Quinn's 
finding that "the Disclosure Statement sent to the shareholders prior to the post-remand 
meeting fully disclosed all material facts." {Id. at 22.) 
As is made clear by his own brief, McLaughlin does not actually dispute the above 
facts (nor could he); instead, he attempts to present contrary arguments and inferences 
about what the facts imply. Although the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"reasonable inferences made from . . . undisputed facts can indeed create a genuine issue 
of material fact," USA Power, LLCv, PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, f 33, 235 P.3d 749 
(emphasis added), it has also made clear that "inferences based on doubtful, vague, 
speculative, or inconclusive evidence" are insufficient to defeat summary judgment, 
Shaw Res, Ltd, LLC. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C, 2006 UT App 313, f 44, 142 
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P.3d 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained below, none of 
the arguments and inferences put forth by McLaughlin are reasonable and some are 
utterly without foundation in fact and are completely fictitious. 
1. All Required Disclosures Were Made to David Rudd Prior to the 
2009 Board Actions. 
McLaughlin states that he disputes Judge Quimf s finding that, prior to the 2009 
Board meeting, David Rudd "analyzed and reviewed documentation concerning all of the 
material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers." (Aplt.'s Brief at 
20 (emphasis added).) However, McLaughlin does not actually dispute that David Rudd 
analyzed and reviewed such documentation, nor could he.15 Instead, in a desperate 
attempt to avoid summary judgment, McLaughlin argues that David Rudd misunderstood 
certain facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers. As set forth below, 
See also Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 
1987) ("[B]are contentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof, 
raise no material questions of fact"). 
15
 David Rudd's deposition testimony overwhelmingly establishes that prior to 
taking the 2009 Board actions at issue, he (1) analyzed and reviewed the 2005 Waivers; 
(2) analyzed and reviewed the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; (3) discussed the proposed 
Board action with legal counsel; (4) discussed the proposed Board action with the other 
members of the Board; (5) analyzed and reviewed the Disclosure Statement sent to 
Cookietree's shareholders concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers (which 
contains a complete disclosure of all material facts concerning Greg Schenk's conflict of 
interest and the 2005 Waivers); (6) analyzed and reviewed Cookietree's financial 
statements and other financial information; and (7) analyzed and reviewed the Court's 
McLaughlin I decision. (See R3385-86.) McLaughlin does not dispute the fact that 
David Rudd took these actions, and the documentation reviewed by him contains all of 
the material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers. 
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McLaughlin's arguments are not supported by the record and are based on blatant 
mischaracterizations of David Rudd's deposition testimony. 
McLaughlin first argues that David Rudd does "not know what consideration was 
paid for the disputed shares in 1999." {Id. at 21.) This is incorrect. During his 
deposition, David Rudd stated that he could not remember what consideration was paid 
for the shares in 1999, but that prior to taking the 2009 Board actions, he reviewed 
several documents, including the Disclosure Statement, and that he was familiar with the 
information contained therein at the time of the Board actions at issue. (R3387.) The 
Disclosure Statement clearly states that Anna Schenk sold the shares at issue to 
Greg Schenk for "$272,600 pursuant to a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement." {Id.) 
The fact that David Rudd did not remember the exact amount paid for the shares at the 
time of his deposition is completely immaterial. 
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd does not know "how many shares . . . 
McLaughlin (and, by extension, other shareholders) would have been able to acquire in 
1999[] had they been given the opportunity . . . ." (Aplt.'s Brief at 21.) This is because 
the number of shares McLaughlin and other shareholders could theoretically have 
purchased is unknown. If the 545,200 shares had not been sold to Greg Schenk, they 
presumably would have continued to be held by Anna Schenk, and McLaughlin would 
not have had the opportunity to purchase any shares. {See R3387 (Rudd Dep. at 29 
("A: I think to say that the shareholders, you know, would have bought those shares also 
takes a leap, because [Anna Schenk] may well have kept them.")).) Alternatively, if 
Anna Schenk had first offered the shares to Cookietree, Cookietree may have purchased 
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all of them. McLaughlin simply ignores that if the transfer restriction provisions in the 
1991 Shareholders' Agreement had been followed in 1999, he may not have had the 
opportunity to purchase any shares.16 David Rudd clearly understood, however, that, if 
the shares had not been sold to Greg Schenk, one possible outcome would have been that 
McLaughlin and other shareholders could have purchased additional shares. David Rudd 
stated that he carefully considered "what potential dividends may have been paid to other 
shareholders, 1999 through 2010, had other shareholders purchased portions of the 
545,200 shares." (R2362 (Rudd Dep. at 25-26).) McLaughlin conveniently ignores this 
aspect of David Rudd's testimony. 
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "only knows one perspective (the one 
controlled by Greg Schenk and his lawyers)," because he never "talked to Anna Schenk" 
or to "Sam McLaughlin." (Aplt.'s Brief at 21.) There is no requirement in the 
Corporation Act that David Rudd speak to Anna Schenk or McLaughlin. Prior to taking 
the Board actions at issue, David Rudd reviewed the 2005 Waivers; he reviewed the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement; he discussed the proposed Board action with the other 
Anna Schenk had no obligation to sell her shares. If she had offered the shares 
to Cookietree, Cookietree could have bought them all, in which case there would have 
been no opportunity for McLaughlin to purchase additional shares. If Cookietree had 
declined its option to purchase some or all of the shares, there is simply no evidence in 
this case suggesting that McLaughlin would or could have purchased any of the shares. 
Finally, even if McLaughlin had been presented with the opportunity to purchase shares 
and had the financial means to take advantage of the opportunity, the number of shares he 
would have purchased is unknown and would have depended on a number of unknowable 
factors, including whether other shareholders had exercised their rights to purchase shares 
and how many. 
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members of the Board; he reviewed the Disclosure Statement; and he reviewed the 
McLaughlin I decision. This documentation fully disclosed all material facts concerning 
the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers. It strains credulity beyond the breaking point 
for McLaughlin to argue that the McLaughlin I decision did not set forth his 
"perspective" regarding the 1999 Stock Sale. (See R3388 (Rudd Dep. at 28 (UQ: Let me 
ask you this. Did you or have you considered factors that would indicate it's not fair to 
the company or the shareholders? A: Well, of course . . . as part of. . . my review of the 
materials and the Supreme Court opinion and the disclosure document . . . yes, I did 
consider it.")).) 
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "incorrectly believes that, in 1999, 
Anna Schenk offered the 545,200 shares . . . to Cookietree" before offering them to 
Greg Schenk. (Aplt.'s Brief at 20.) This is utterly false. David Rudd testified that the 
shares were not offered to Cookietree in 1999, or at any time. (See R3388 (Rudd Dep. at 
45 ("A: . . . I was confused when you were asking the question about the process that 
occurred in 1999 as to whether the shares were offered to the company and the 
shareholders. . . . [T]he shares were not offered to the company or to the 
shareholders."))); see also R3389 (Rudd Dep. at 50 ("Q: And so you understand - well, 
do you understand that the shareholder agreement was not complied with in 1999 when 
the shares were transferred from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk? A: Yeah, otherwise, 
there wouldn't be a waiver agreements (emphases added))).) Giving counsel for 
McLaughlin every benefit of the doubt, it appears the foregoing argument was made 
without carefully reviewing the entirety of David Rudd's testimony (although counsel for 
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McLaughlin made the same erroneous argument to the trial court), not with the intent to 
deceive this Court. Either way, McLaughlin's statement that David Rudd believed that 
the transfer restriction provisions were followed in 1999 is utterly false. 
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd believes that one of the factors bearing 
on whether the 1999 Stock Sale was fair to the shareholders is "the contribution of people 
who run the business . . . [and] add certain benefits to the business," but that David Rudd 
does not have any understanding "as to whether McLaughlin was such an employee." 
(Aplt.'s Brief at 22.) David Rudd simply did not testify that one of the factors bearing on 
whether the 1999 Stock Sale was fair to the shareholders is the contribution of people 
who run the business. McLaughlin's suggestion to the contrary is based on a complete 
mischaracterization of David Rudd's deposition testimony. Further, McLaughlin's job 
performance while he was employed by Cookietree is entirely immaterial, because at the 
time David Rudd effectuated the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification, McLaughlin was 
not employed by Cookietree. Further, whether the 2005 Waivers were fair to 
McLaughlin individually is simply not relevant. 
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "stated that notice [to the other 
shareholders] should have been given" in 1999. {Id. at 22.) McLaughlin, again, 
misconstrues David Rudd's testimony. Although David Rudd stated that the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement contains a notice provision, he also stated that any of its 
provisions (including the notice provision) can be waived as provided in paragraph 11. 
{See R3390 (Rudd Dep. at 90 ("Q: And do you have an understanding of the effect of 
paragraph 11 on the shareholder agreement and whether parties to the contract could rely 
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on paragraph 11? A: Yes, they could rely on paragraph 11 just as much as any other 
paragraph in the agreement.")).) All of the shareholders (including McLaughlin and his 
wife) were given notice of the proposed 2009 Shareholders' Waiver. Indeed, 
McLaughlin's counsel, as proxy for McLaughlin, attended the 2009 shareholders' 
meeting on behalf of McLaughlin and voiced their disapproval of and voted against the 
proposed shareholder actions. Clearly, the other shareholders did not agree with 
McLaughlin. 
Finally, McLaughlin argues that David Rudd testified that "parties to a contract. . 
. have the right to expect that the contract's provisions are followed," but he voted in 
favor of the 2009 Board waiver. (Aplt.'s Brief at 22.) David Rudd did testify: "I think 
people who sign contracts can fairly expect that they'll be followed." (R3391 (Rudd 
Dep. 80-81).) However, David Rudd also testified that, in 2005, Cookietree's Board and 
shareholders "could rely on Paragraph 11 [of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement] just as 
much as any other paragraph of the agreement. Paragraph 11 deals with a waiver of the 
sale restrictions by an authorized action by the board or by the shareholders holding at 
least two-thirds of the shares." (Id. (Rudd Dep. at 90).) 
In sum, McLaughlin does not dispute the fact that David Rudd was aware of all 
material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers before he 
effectuated the 2009 Board Ratification, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-850(4)(a)-(b). McLaughlin's argument that David Rudd misunderstood certain 
facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers is, for the reasons set forth 
above, utterly without merit. 
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2. All Required Disclosures Were Made to the Shareholders Prior 
to the 2009 Shareholder Actions. 
McLaughlin concedes, as he must, that the Disclosure Statement contained all 
facts concerning the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, the transfer restriction provisions 
contained therein, the 1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of 
interest and the circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the McLaughlin I decision. 
McLaughlin also concedes that a copy of the McLaughlin I decision was enclosed with 
the Disclosure Statement. (Aplt.'s Brief at 22.) 
However, McLaughlin argues, in scattershot fashion, that the Disclosure Statement 
(1) did not contain a "counter opinion," (2) was drafted by litigation counsel, (3) was 
confusing to read, (4) did not disclose whether Greg Schenk paid consideration for the 
2005 Waivers, and (5) did not disclose whether Harold Rosemann received consideration 
for the 2005 Waivers. For the following reasons, Judge Quinn correctly determined that 
none of these arguments created a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
First, McLaughlin's argument that the Disclosure Statement does not contain a 
"counter opinion" is wrong. The Disclosure Statement enclosed a copy of the 
McLaughlin I decision, which clearly sets forth McLaughlin's position regarding the 
2005 Waivers, the 1999 Stock Sale, and the duty of good faith owed by shareholders in 
close corporations. Moreover, although McLaughlin conveniently ignores this fact, his 
own counsel (the same counsel representing him in this appeal) attended the 2009 
shareholders' meeting in person and voiced their disapproval of and voted against the 
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proposed shareholder actions. Clearly, the other shareholders did not agree with 
McLaughlin or his counsel. 
Second, whether the Disclosure Statement was drafted by Cookietree's counsel is 
simply irrelevant. The fact that counsel drafted the Disclosure Statement does not mean 
that anything contained therein is inaccurate, and, tellingly, McLaughlin fails to argue 
that anything contained therein is inaccurate. The trial court correctly refused to assume 
the existence of inaccuracies simply because counsel drafted the document. 
Third, McLaughlin's argument that the Disclosure Statement is "confusing to 
read" is merely his opinion (albeit an erroneous one) and does not create a triable issue of 
fact. 
Fourth, McLaughlin's suggestion that Greg Schenk paid and Harold Rosemann 
received consideration for the 2005 Waivers has no foundation in fact and is completely 
fictional. Greg Schenk clearly testified that he did not pay any consideration to 
Harold Rosemann (or anyone else) for the 2005 Waivers. (R3335-36.) Likewise, 
Harold Rosemann clearly testified that he did not receive any consideration from 
Greg Schenk (or anyone else) in exchange for his votes in favor of the 2005 Waivers. 
(R3336.) Thus the Disclosure Statement did not address the issue of the consideration 
paid for the 2005 Waivers, because there was no such consideration paid. McLaughlin 
has simply manufactured this issue out of thin air, without even the proverbial shred of 
evidence to support it. 
In sum, McLaughlin has failed to manufacture a disputed issue of material fact 
concerning the disclosures made in connection with the 2009 Ratifications. The 
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shareholders were fully informed in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-850(4)(a)-(b). Thus Judge Quinn correctly entered summary judgment in favor 
of Appellees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Quinn properly complied, on remand, with 
this Court's decision in McLaughlin I in ruling that he could consider options other than a 
fairness hearing - namely, the 2009 Ratifications - for resolving the nontransaction 
conflict of interest situation at issue. Judge Quinn also correctly determined that the 2009 
Ratifications complied with the framework set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation 
Act, and that there are no disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
Thus, Judge Quinn's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees should be 
affirmed and this case should be closed. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2012. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
l^M^t Matthew M. Dur%m (#6214) 
Justin B. Palmer (#8937) 
Attorneys for Appellees Greg Schenk and 
Cookietree, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850, -851, -852, -853 (2012). 
2. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146 
3. Minutes of December 18, 2009 Board Meeting 
4. Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, Disclosure Statement, and 
Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders 
5. Minutes of 2009 Annual Shareholders Meeting 
6. Certificate and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting Judge 
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850 (2012) 
§ 16-10a-850. Definitions relating to conflicting interest transactions 
As used in Sections 16-10a-850 through 16-10a-853: 
(1) "Conflicting interest" with respect to a corporation means the interest a director has 
respecting a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation or by any entity 
in which the corporation has a controlling interest if: 
(a) whether or not the transaction is brought before the board of directors of the 
corporation for action, the director knows at the time of commitment that the director or a 
related person of the director is a party to the transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in 
or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the transaction is so financially significant to the 
director or a related person of the director that the interest would reasonably be expected to 
exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on the 
transaction; or 
(b) the transaction is brought, or is of a character and significance to the corporation that it 
would in the normal course be brought, before the board of directors for action, and the director 
knows at the time of commitment that any of the following persons is either a party to the 
transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the transaction and 
the transaction is so financially significant to the person that the interest would reasonably be 
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called upon to 
vote on the transaction: 
(i) an entity, other than the corporation, of which the director is a director, general 
partner, agent, or employee or an entity to which the director owes a fiduciary duty, other than 
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a fiduciary duty arising because the director is a director of the corporation; 
(ii) an individual who is a general partner, principal, or employer of the director or who is 
a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty owed by the director, other than a fiduciary duty arising 
because the director is a director of the corporation; or , 
(iii) a person that controls one or more of the entities specified in Subsection (l)(b)(i) or 
an entity that is controlled by, or is under common control with, one or more of the entities or 
individuals specified in Subsection (l)(b)(i) or (l)(b)(ii). 
(2) "Director's conflicting interest transaction" with respect to a corporation means a . 
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation, or by any entity controlled by 
the corporation respecting which a director has a conflicting interest. 
(3) "Qualified director" means, with respect to a director's conflicting interest transaction, any 
director who does not have either a conflicting interest respecting the transaction, or a familial, 
financial, professional, or employment relationship with a second director who does have a 
conflicting interest respecting the transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, 
reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the 
transaction. 
(4) "Required disclosure" means disclosure by the director who has a conflicting interest of: 
(a) the existence and nature of the conflicting interest; and ' 
(b) all facts known to the director respecting the subject matter of the transaction that an 
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably believe to be material to a judgment about whether 
or not to proceed with the transaction. 
(5) "Time of commitment" respecting a transaction means the time when the transaction is < 
consummated or, if made pursuant to contract, the time when the corporation or the entity 
controlled by the corporation becomes contractually obligated so that its unilateral withdrawal 
from the transaction would entail significant loss, liability, or other damage. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-850, enacted by L 1992, ch. 277, § 104. 
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§ 16-10a-851. Judicial action 
(1) A transaction effected or proposed to be effected by a corporation or by any entity 
controlled by the corporation that is not a director's conflicting interest transaction may not be 
enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding 
by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, solely because a director, or any 
person with whom or which the director has a personal, economic, or other association, has an 
interest in the transaction. 
(2) A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to 
an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right 
of the corporation, solely because the director, or any person with whom or which the director 
has a personal, economic, or other association, has an interest in the transaction, if: 
(a) directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with 
Section 16-10a-852; 
(b) shareholders' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with 
Section 16-10a-853; or 
(c) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of commitment, is 
established to have been fair to the corporation. 
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§ 16-10a-852. Directors' action 
(1) Directors' action respecting a transaction is taken for purposes of Subsection 16-10a-851 
(2)(a) if the transaction received the affirmative vote of a majority of those qualified directors 
on the board of directors or on a duly empowered committee of the board who voted on the 
transaction after either required disclosure to them, to the extent the information was not 
known by them, or compliance with Subsection (2), provided that action by a committee is 
effective under this subsection only if: 
(a) all its members are qualified directors; and 
(b) its members are either ail of the qualified directors or are appointed by the affirmative 
vote of a majority of the qualified directors. 
(2) If a director has a conflicting interest respecting a transaction, but neither the director nor a 
related person of the director is a party to the transaction, and if the director has a duty under 
law or professional canon, or a duty of confidentiality to another person, respecting information 
relating to the transaction so that the director may not make the disclosure described in Section 
16-10a-S50(4)(b), then disclosure is sufficient for purposes of Subsection (1) if the director 
discloses to the directors voting on the transaction, before their vote, the existence and nature 
of the conflicting interest and informs them of the character and limitations imposed by that 
duty. 
(3) A majority of the qualified directors on the board of directors or on the committee, as the 
case may be, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section. 
Directors' action that otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence or 
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vote of a director who is not a qualified director. 
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§ 16-10a-853. Shareholders' action 
(1) Shareholders' action respecting a transaction is effective for purposes of Subsection 16-
10a-851(2)(b) if a quorum existed pursuant to Subsection (2) and a majority of the votes 
entitled to be cast by holders of qualified shares present in person or by proxy at the meeting 
were cast in favor of the transaction after notice to shareholders describing the director's 
conflicting interest transaction, provision of the information referred to in Subsection (3), and 
required disclosure to the shareholders who voted on the transaction, to the extent the 
information was not known by them. 
(2) A majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the holders of all qualified shares constitutes a 
quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section. Subject to the provisions of 
Subsections (3) and (4), shareholders' action that otherwise complies with this section is not 
affected by the presence of holders of, or the voting of, shares that are not qualified shares. 
(3) For purposes of compliance with Subsection (1), a director who has a conflicting interest 
respecting the transaction shall, before the shareholders vote, inform the secretary or other 
officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes of the number and the identity of 
persons holding or controlling the vote, of all shares that the director knows are beneficially 
owned, or the voting of which is controlled, by the director or by a related person of the 
director, or both. 
(4) If a shareholders' vote does not comply with Subsection (1) solely because of a failure of a 
director to comply with Subsection (3), and if the director establishes that the failure did not 
determine and was not intended by him to influence the outcome of the vote, the court may, 
with or without further proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-851(2)(c), take any action 
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considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
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Samuel R. McLaughlin and John Does 1-10, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Greg Schenk, Estate of 
Boyd Schenk, Anna Schenk, Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation, Harold Rosemann, and Gayle 
Schenk, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20070688 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
2009 UT 64; 220 P.3d 146; 640 Utah Adv. Rep. 27; 2009 Utah LEXIS 192 
October 2, 2009, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Released for Publication December 3, 2009. 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] 
Third District, Salt Lake. The Honorable Robert K. Hilder. No. 040924997. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant minority shareholder (and employee) brought breach of 
contract and fiduciary duty claims against appellants, the company (a closely held corporation) 
and its president, as well as a derivative action. Some of the contractual claims were 
arbitrated in the shareholder's favor. The Third District Court, Salt Lake, Utah, granted the 
company's motion to dismiss the rest of the shareholder's claims on summary judgment, and 
he appealed. 
OVERVIEW: On review, the shareholder raised several issues contending the district court 
erred in rendering the summary judgment. The supreme court held that the president, as a 
close corporation shareholder, owed the minority shareholder individually a duty to act in the 
utmost good faith, but that he did not violate this duty because his actions did not thwart the 
minority shareholder's reasonable expectations; the minority shareholder was not a founding 
member who created the company with the expectation of employment, and while it was likely 
that his initial stock purchase allowance and the later stock purchase agreement were offered 
as an incentive or reward for his work performance, the purchase allowances were not 
inextricably tied to his employment, but a separate investment in the company. Additionally, 
waivers executed by the board and the shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by 
a conflict of interest, and the case needed to be remanded for a determination of whether the 
waivers were fair. Finally, the supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the minority shareholder's motion to amend as it would have been futile. 
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OUTCOME: The cause was remanded for a determination of whether the waivers ratifying a 
share transfer were fair; otherwise, the judgment was affirmed. 
CORE TERMS: shareholder, fiduciary duty, stock, conflict of interest, good faith, termination, 
fiduciary, duty owed, stockholder, oppression, publicly, utmost, reasonable expectations, 
partnership, partner's, salary, amend, majority shareholder, bylaws, owe, matter of law, 
minority shareholder, summary judgment, selling, futile, dissolution, breached, waiving, case 
law, common law 
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HN1±ln a public corporation, directors and officers owe the corporation and the 
shareholders collectively a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the 
corporat ion. More Like This Headnote 
Business & Corporate Law > General Partnerships > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary 
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HN2±ln a partnership, each partner owes each of the other partners individually a duty to 
act with the utmost good faith. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review £ ] 
w/v3jk When the trial court dismisses a case on summary judgment, the supreme court 
reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review fe] 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > Appropriateness t 2 
H/V4±Summary judgment is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, when reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the 
supreme court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences im the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. More Like This Headnote 
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unlimited. More Like This Headnote 
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corporations to proceed as a class of one in derivative actions. Courts also allow close 
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shareholders. More Like This Headnote 
Business & Corporate Law > Closely Held Corporations > General Overview ^1 
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active shareholder participation in the business. More Like This Headnote | 
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^ $ i Directors and officers are required to carry out their corporate duties in good faith, 
with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation. Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10a-840 (2005). These corporate duties are interpreted to coincide with the common 
law understanding that officers and directors owe these duties to the corporation and 
shareholders collectively, not individually. Actions for breach of a fiduciary duty 
generally belong to the corporation. More Like This Headnote | 
Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Business & Corporate Law > General Partnerships > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary 
Responsibilities > Duty of Good Faith & Loyalty fej 
HN10±ln contrast to the general standard for corporate duties, the statutory partnership 
standard of care is interpreted to require the utmost good faith between individual 
partners. Normally, partners occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each 
other in the utmost good faith. Partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each other, 
and that is the duty of each partner to observe the utmost good faith towards his 
copartners in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the 
partnership business. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (2007). More Like This Headnote | 
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w/vi2± Breaches of the fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders arise in 
several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These circumstances 
may be unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations of involvement, 
and a freezeout or squeezeout. In all cases there is a common element, a 
shareholder's investment expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another 
shareholder 's actions. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
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HN13±\Nhen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit alleging a breach of the 
strict good faith duty, courts must carefully analyze the action taken by the 
controlling stockholders in the individual case and ask whether the controlling group 
can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action. Under this standard for 
fiduciary duty protection, the termination of an employee is not always a breach of 
f iduciary duty. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Business & Corporate Law > Closely Held Corporations > Management Duties & Liabilities Q 
HN14±,Not every discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens to 
own stock in the corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
Instead, the court must consider the formal policies and practices of the close 
corporation, and how these policies and practices are interpreted by and impact all 
shareholders to determine whether or not a shareholder's reasonable expectations 
were thwarted. When considering an allegation of oppressive conduct, a court 
should review what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be 
the petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct 
should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes 
and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone should not 
necessarily be equated with oppression. This close consideration of shareholders' 
expectations is necessary to ensure that corporations are not crippled and kept from 
efficiently operating their business; it is well accepted that corporate officers must 
have a large measure of discretion in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding 
whether to merge or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, 
dismissing directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate 
employees. More Like This Headnote 
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General Overview ifetl 
HNts^under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-821(2) of Utah's Corporation Act, the waivers are 
effective as of the date indicated by the board of directors in the waiver and 
consent. More Like This Headnote 
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of Action > General Overview toil • 
HNi6jkUnder Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 of Utah's Corporation Act, a corporation is 
allowed to enter a separate shareholder agreement that governs the management 
and affairs of the corporation and the relationships among the shareholders despite 
a conflict with the bylaws so long as it does not violate public 
policy. More Like This Headnote 
Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & Liabilities > Causes 
of Action > General Overview fcj 
H/VI7±A person is considered to have a conflict of interest if he has an interest in a 
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation or by any entity in 
which the corporation has a controlling interest. Utah. Code Ann. § 16-10a-850 
(1). More Like This Headnote 
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H/vis^r Many situations arise in which a director's or shareholder's personal economic 
interest is or may be adverse to the economic interest of the corporation, but which 
do not entail a "transaction" by or with the corporation. These situations are no less 
concerning because on the surface they appear to suffer from the same lack of 
probity and fair dealing as statutory conflict of interest transactions. The law does 
not ignore such troubling circumstances, but instead leaves the treatment of such 
situations for development under the common law. Procedures designed to deal with 
statutory conflicts of interest provide a useful strategy for dealing with such 
situations as a matter of common law. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings > General Overview fc-
HN19±When considering a motion to amend, the district court should primarily consider 
whether the motion would cause unavoidable prejudice to the opposing party. In 
addition, the district court may also consider delay, bad faith, or futility of the 
amendment. A party cannot obtain a different outcome by adding to the parties or 
rephrasing claims. More Like This Headnote 
COUNSEL: Lincoln W. Hobbs v / , Margaret H. Olson v*S, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Matthew M. Durham ^
 t Justin B. Palmer^, George M. Haley v#, Richard D. Flint •*£, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
JUDGES: DURHAM • , Chief Justice. Associate Chief Justice Durrant^, Justice Wilkins, Justice 
Parrish ^, and District Judge Hadfield ^ concur in Chief Justice Durham Vs opinion. Justice 
Nehring r^ does not participate herein; District Judge Ben H. Hadfield • sat. 
OPINION BY: DURHAM ^ 
OPINION 
[**150] DURHAM ^ Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] HNlmfiri a public corporation, directors and officers owe the corporation and the 
shareholders collectively a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation. 
HN2r+ln a partnership, each partner owes each of the other partners individually a duty to act 
with the utmost good faith. The appellant in this case, Samuel R. McLaughlin, a minority 
shareholder in a closely held corporation, asks this court to impose on shareholders in such 
corporations a duty to individual shareholders similar to the duty owed in a partnership. 
McLaughlin also asks us to reverse the district court's holding that waivers of a provision of this 
closely held corporation's shareholder [***2] agreement were valid, and reverse its order 
denying amendments to McLaughlin's complaint. We hold that the appellee Greg Schenck, as a 
close corporation shareholder, owed McLaughlin individually a duty to act in the utmost good 
faith, but that he did not violate this duty because his actions did not thwart McLaughlin's 
reasonable expectations. Additionally, we hold that waivers executed by the board and the 
shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by a conflict of interest, and we therefore 
remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair. Finally, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying McLaughlin's motion to amend by finding that the 
amendment would be futile. 
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BACKGROUND 
[*P2] ^ ^ B e c a u s e the trial court dismissed this case on summary judgment, "we review the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party," in this case, McLaughlin. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgmt, Ltd,, 2007 UT App 131, P 5, 163 P.3d 
636. 
[*P3] Cookietree, Inc. is a privately held Utah corporation that produces and retails baked 
goods. The company was formed in 1981, with Greg Schenck and his father, Boyd Schenck, 
among the original [***3] shareholders. Greg Schenck was named president at the 
corporation's founding. He currently holds the same position. In 1992, Greg Schenck recruited 
Sam McLaughlin to work as the operations leader for Cookietree. McLaughlin's previous 
experience at Pillsbury and Quaker Oats made him a valuable employee, and he was quickly 
promoted to vice president of operations and then chief operating officer and vice president of 
operations. As he invested more of his career in Cookietree, McLaughlin also invested his 
personal finances in the corporation by slowly purchasing increasing amounts of shares in the 
corporation. 
[*P4] As part of his agreement to join Cookietree as an employee, McLaughlin and the 
company agreed to certain terms, which were memorialized in an employment agreement. This 
agreement guaranteed McLaughlin a minimum salary that was supplemented with a bonus 
formula. It also provided him with the option of acquiring up to 200,000 shares of common stock 
in the company. Importantly, under the agreement, McLaughlin was an at-will employee. Thus, 
either party could terminate the employment relationship at any time so long as six-months 
notice was given. 
[**151] [*P5] In 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin [***4] entered into an Incentive Stock 
Option Agreement that allowed McLaughlin to purchase an additional 200,000 shares of the 
company's common stock. This agreement also required McLaughlin to agree to a 1991 
Shareholder Agreement. The 1991 Shareholder Agreement limited the ability of shareholders to 
sell, assign, or pledge their common stock. Under the agreement, selling shareholders had to first 
offer their shares, by written notice, to the corporation. If Cookietree did not elect to purchase 
any or all of the shares, the secretary of Cookietree was required to provide written notice to all 
shareholders identifying the number of shares available for purchase. Each shareholder was then 
entitled to purchase a portion of the shares equal to his or her ownership percentage of the 
outstanding common stock. If, at the close of the applicable option periods, not all available 
shares had been purchased, the selling shareholder could then sell the shares elsewhere. The 
agreement also provided that written consent from either the board of directors or the owners of 
at least two-thirds of the shares (excluding the shares owned by the selling shareholder) could 
waive the agreement's restrictions [***5] on share transfers. The 1991 Shareholder Agreement 
was replaced in 1999 with a new shareholder agreement, which contained the same terms. 
[*P6] In 1998, the majority shareholder of Cookietree, Boyd Schenck, passed away. Just 
before his death he transferred 818,000 shares to Greg Schenck. x Following this transfer Greg 
Schenck owned around 49 percent of Cookietree, with Boyd Schenck retaining around ten 
percent (545,200) of the company's shares. After Boyd's death, Boyd's wife, Anna, 2 sold Greg 
Schenck 545,200 shares, making Greg Schenck the majority shareholder, with about sixty-five 
percent of the company's stock. This transfer was not recorded in Cookietree's minutes or written 
records, and a right of first refusal was not provided to the corporation or the other shareholders. 
Stock certificates were nonetheless issued. At the time this transfer was made, it violated the 
1991 Shareholder Agreement. 
FOOTNOTES 
I This transaction was not subject to the right of refusal provisions of the shareholder 
agreement because it was a transfer between immediate family members, which was allowed 
under the 1991 Shareholder Agreement. 
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2 The parties disagree on whether Boyd's estate or Anna transferred the shares to 
[***6] Greg Schenck. The district court indicated in its order that Anna transferred the 
shares to Greg Schenck. We rely on this implicit factual finding. 
[*P7] In 2003, Greg Schenck indicated that he was interested in selling Cookietree. McLaughlin 
wanted to purchase the company and sent a letter of intent, which conveyed this interest to 
Cookietree and its president, Greg Schenck. McLaughlin, however, was never able to raise the full 
amount of the purchase price. During this period, Greg Schenck began discussions with another 
cookie company, Otis Spunkmeyer, which was interested as a strategic buyer in purchasing 
Cookietree. 
[*P8] At this point, the relationship between McLaughlin and Greg Schenck, which previously 
had been not only professional but also personal and social, began to deteriorate. McLaughlin 
would not agree to various terms of the Otis Spunkmeyer transaction, including consent to a 
noncompete agreement. About this same time, McLaughlin learned of the prior stock transfer 
between Anna Schenck and Greg Schenck. During the discussions with Otis Spunkmeyer, 
McLaughlin insisted on his right of first refusal for any sold and transferred stock. McLaughlin was 
thereafter excluded from executive [***7] meetings. McLaughlin alleges that after he asserted 
his right to a bonus on the asset sale of Cookietree to Otis Spunkmeyer, Greg Schenck and Otis 
Spunkmeyer officers negotiated to instead structure the sale as a stock sale. McLaughlin 
continued to demand his right of first refusal and requested documentation regarding Anna 
Schenck's stock sale to Greg Schenck. 
[*P9] On August 4, 2004, Harold Rosemann, board member and chief financial officer for 
Cookietree, instructed Kim McLaughlin, McLaughlin's wife and also an employee of Cookietree, to 
tell McLaughlin to withdraw his claims or "there's going to be some organizational changes around 
here." On August [**152] 17, 2004, as a shareholder, McLaughlin made an additional request 
for information regarding the Schenck stock transaction. That same day Greg Schenck confronted 
McLaughlin and fired him. His notice of termination indicated that it was without cause. Pursuant 
to McLaughlin's employment agreement, the termination date was not effective for six months. 
Thus, McLaughlin continued to receive his salary and bonuses for six months, although this 
compensation was paid at his original contract rate rather than his current salary and bonus rate. 
McLaughlin [***8] was immediately relieved of all duties, blocked from company email, and 
excluded from the corporate premises. When McLaughlin refused to leave, police escorted him 
from the property. After McLaughlin's termination, Cookietree contacted McLaughlin's lawyer and 
indicated that "everything [was] negotiable; [they] were looking for a global resolution." 
Following his termination McLaughlin continued to receive dividends from his Cookietree holdings. 
This income, along with his wife's stock dividends, comprised half of their family's income. Kim 
McLaughlin continued to work at Cookietree for some time after McLaughlin's termination. 
[*P10] In November 2004, McLaughlin sued Cookietree and Greg Schenck for breach of 
contract and breach of fiduciary duty based on Greg Schenck's stock acquisition. In March 2005, 
Mclaughlin filed another suit against Cookietree and Greg Schenck for breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duty based on McLaughlin's termination. McLaughlin also filed a derivative 
action. All three cases were then consolidated in the district court. The district court referred 
McLaughlin's claims relating to his employment contract to arbitration. McLaughlin was awarded 
damages for [***9] Cookietree's breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing for 
paying the 1992 contract salary rate for McLaughlin's severance pay rather than his most recent 
salary and bonus rate. The arbitrator dismissed all other contract claims and deferred to the 
district court to resolve the breach of fiduciary duty claim relating to the termination. 
[*P11] In May 2005 during an unnoticed meeting, Cookietree's board of directors—Greg 
Schenck; his wife, Gayle Schenck; and Harold Rosemann-ratified the 1999 stock transaction by 
waiving the corporation's right of refusal. Around the same time, Greg Schenck contacted Jerry 
Smekal, a Cookietree shareholder, and requested that he also sign a consent and waiver ratifying 
the 1999 transaction. Smekal, who held 529,000 shares, agreed to sign the form. Additionally, 
Greg Schenck and Harold Rosemann also signed the shareholder consent and waiver forms, 
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representing 2,181,200 and 316,000 respectively, or nearly ninety percent, of Cookietree's 
shares. 
[*P12] Cookietree moved to dismiss McLaughlin's claims on summary judgment. The district 
court granted the motion and dismissed all pending claims, finding that Greg Schenck did not 
owe any fiduciary duty to [***10] McLaughlin with respect to the "dealings related to 
McLaughlin in his role as an employee" and that Cookietree, not Greg Schenck, terminated 
McLaughlin from his employment. Additionally, with respect to the stock transaction, the district 
court found that "all of the actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenck were within the 
terms of the [1991 shareholder] agreement and, to the extent certain corporate actions were not 
undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005 waiver and ratification actions were effective as a 
matter of law." With these findings, the district court held that it was "unable to identify any 
factual claim . . . that would give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," and thus dismissed 
all claims, but left McLaughlin with the option to "come forward with facts and evidence that 
would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim that has not already been addressed." Shortly 
thereafter, McLaughlin moved for permission to amend his complaint by adding Gayle Schenck 
and Harold Rosemann as additional parties. The basis for his breach of fiduciary duty claims 
largely remained the same. The district court denied this motion holding that an amendment 
would be futile [ * * *n ] because McLaughlin failed to identify any evidence that was not 
addressed by the summary judgment. McLaughlin appealed the district court's final order. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008). 
[**153] ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P13] McLaughlin asks this court to review the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
the defendants on three grounds. First, McLaughlin asks the court to determine whether 
Cookietree shareholders owed McLaughlin fiduciary duties individually, and if so whether any 
such duty was violated. Second, McLaughlin requests that we review whether the board's and 
shareholders' 2005 ratifications were "valid and effective." Finally, McLaughlin argues the district 
court abused its discretion in denying McLaughlin's motion to amend his complaint. 
[*P14] w/V4"?Summary judgment "is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr.r 2008 UT 88, P 12, 200 P.3d 643. 
Accordingly, when "reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review the facts 
and all reasonable inferences in the light [***12] most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. 
As to the underlying determinations, W W 5 ? w e review legal questions, such as the scope of a 
shareholder's fiduciary duty and the validity of share transfers under the shareholder agreement, 
for correctness. HN6lh\Ne review a district court's decision to deny a plaintiff's motion to amend 
its complaint for abuse of discretion. See Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 
22, P15, 134 P.3d 1122. We note, however, that this discretion is not unlimited. Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281-82 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
I. SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS OWE EACH OTHER ENHANCED FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES, BUT SCHENCK DID NOT VIOLATE ANY DUTY OWED TO MCLAUGHLIN 
[*P15] This case presents the question of whether shareholders of closely held corporations 3— 
also commonly known as close corporations—should be treated differently than shareholders of 
publicly traded corporations when applying the provisions of the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act (the Corporation Act), Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101 to -1705 (2005 & Supp. 
2008), and the accompanying interpretive and common law case law. We previously 
acknowledged that in close [***13] corporations it is "unlikely that there is a disinterested 
board," Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998), 
and that such corporations are more vulnerable to malfeasance because of the overlapping 
identity of board members and majority shareholders. Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 
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40, P 21, 216 P.3d 944. For these reasons, W / V 7 ?we have treated close corporations differently 
by allowing shareholders in these corporations to proceed as a class of one in derivative actions. 
Id. P 22. We also have allowed close corporation shareholders to proceed both derivatively and 
directly against corporate officers for breaches of duties owed to the corporation and to minority 
shareholders. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc., 970 P.2d at 1280-81. In this case we now consider 
whether the duties owed by shareholders differ in closely held corporations and publicly traded 
corporations, and if so, whether these duties were breached on those facts. 
FOOTNOTES 
3 HN8w+in Utah, we consider a closely held corporation to be a company in which there is "'(1) 
a small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3) active 
shareholder participation in the business.'" [***14] Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 
UT 40, P 21 216 P.3d 944 (quoting Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, P 17, 134 P.3d 
1139). 
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations Is Similar to the Duty of 
Partners in a Partnership 
[*P16] Under the revised business code, HN9^d\rectors and officers are required to carry out 
their corporate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-840 (2005). These corporate duties have been interpreted to coincide 
with the common law understanding that officers and directors owe these duties to the 
corporation and shareholders collectively, not individually. Aurora [**154] Credit Servs., 970 
P.2d at 1280 (indicating that actions for breach of a fiduciary duty generally belong to the 
corporation). In this case, however, McLaughlin urges us to apply a different standard—the 
partnership standard. HNX0^if] contrast to the general standard for corporate duties, the 
statutory partnership standard of care has been interpreted to require the utmost good faith 
between individual partners. Ong, Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 453-54 
(Utah 1993) ("Normally partners 'occupy [***15] a fiduciary relationship and must deal with 
each other in the utmost good faith.'" (quoting Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 
1982)); Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P. 865, 868 (Utah 1910) ("[Pjartners stand in a 
fiduciary relation to each other, and that[]is the duty of each partner to observe the utmost good 
faith towards his copartners in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the 
partnership business."); Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (2007). 
[*P17] Whether to modify the fiduciary duty standard in closely held corporations is an issue of 
first impression for this court. Numerous other states have considered the question, and; we look 
to their analyses and to the Corporation Act's language and structure to guide our determination. 
See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, P 17, 991 P.2d 584 (indicating that 
in the absence of Utah precedent, the court looks to Utah statutes and "case law from other 
jurisdictions for guidance"). 
[*P18] McLaughlin urges us to follow the partnership-like duty standard originally articulated 
by Massachusetts courts and subsequently adopted by several other states. Beginning with 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), 
[***16] Massachusetts changed the landscape of duties owed by shareholders in close 
corporations. Relying on (1) the resemblance between close corporations and partnerships, (2) 
the need for trust and confidence in such companies, and (3) the inherent risk of loss due to 
shareholders' inability to recoup their investments, the Massachusetts court imposed on close 
corporation shareholders the same duties owed by partners—utmost good faith and loyalty to all 
shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 515. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors 
and stockholders of public corporations, the court found this duty to be "more rigorous" than the 
"somewhat less stringent" corporate duty of "good faith and inherent fairness." Id. at 515-16. 
The Donahue court explained, "stockholders in close corporations must discharge their 
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management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. 
They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty 
to the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. at 515. The Massachusetts courts have 
repeatedly upheld and applied this standard. See O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 868 N.E.2d 
118, 124 (Mass. 2007); [***17] Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 
(Mass. 1988); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 { 
(Mass. 1976). The Donahue standard has also been adopted by other jurisdictions. Hollis v. Hill, 
232 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that Donahue's "recognition of special rules of 
fiduciary duty applicable to close corporations has gained widespread acceptance."); Orchard v. 
Coveili, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1984). ("The duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in 
the context of closely[]held corporations has been recognized by a number of courts confronting 
similar fact situations."). ' 
[*P19] The defendants, however, urge this court to follow the minority position, which has 
been adopted by Delaware and Texas. The minority position narrowly construes the duties of 
shareholders in a closely held corporation and differentiates between a person's status as 
employee and shareholder. In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, for example, the Delaware Supreme 
Court noted that Delaware had not adopted Massachusetts' approach to fiduciary duties, but 
instead imposed identical duties on shareholders of closely held corporations and public 
corporations. 683 A.2d 37, 39 n.2 (Del. 1996); [***18] accord Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 
472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) ("[A] co-shareholder in a closely held corporation does not as a 
matter of law owe a fiduciary duty to his co-shareholder."). Additionally, the Delaware Supreme 
Court distinguished between the [**155] plaintiff's rights as a stockholder and his contractual 
rights as an employee. Riblet Prods. Corp., 683 A.2d at 40. While the court noted the Riblet 
plaintiff had not alleged that his termination amounted to a wrongful freeze-out of his stock 
interest, in subsequent cases where the plaintiff has made such allegations, other courts 
following Delaware's approach have determined that any injury caused by a termination decision 
would only be an injury to an individual's employment interests and not to his interests as a 
stockholder. Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., Ltd., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000). At least 
one court has described this approach as being more predictable because it treats all 
corporations the same way. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (comparing Ohio's Donahue fiduciary duty standard for close corporations to 
Delaware's traditional standard). The Delaware approach thus stands [***19] in sharp contrast 
to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the majority of states. 
[*P20] Presented with two divergent approaches, we must assess which approach best suits 
Utah's corporate law scheme. Our Corporation Act does not provide explicit guidance, as it does 
not directly address close corporations or duties between shareholders. However, considering the 
Act as a whole and its specific provisions together, such as the duties imposed on directors and 
the dissolution remedy explicitly outlined, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-840, -1430(l)(b), we 
believe it is apparent that the legislature intended to protect shareholders from oppression and 
misconduct by those in control. To construe the Act's provisions to require the same fiduciary 
duties for publicly held and closely held corporate shareholders would not adequately protect 
close corporation shareholders. This is because the Model Business Code, on which the Utah 
Corporation Act was based, was developed largely in the context of publicly held corporations and 
the common law surrounding their governance. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. Introduction 
(2009) ("[T]he Model Act does not geenerally distinguish between publicly held and privately 
[***20] held corporations." Additionally, the Model Act "was amended in 1990 and 2006 "to 
provide greater certainty and more flexibility to non-public corporations.); See also F. Hodge 
O'Neal, Robert B. Thompson, & Blake Thompson, O'Neal & Thompson's Close Corporations and 
LLCs: Law and Practice § 9:21 (3d ed. 2004) ("Courts recognize that the usual default rules of 
corporate law affect close corporations differently from large publicly held corporations . . . ."). 
Close corporations differ, however, in significant ways, and when these differences result in 
undesired outcomes, we have interpreted the Corporation Act in a way that achieves the intent 
and goal of the Act as a whole. This is a trend followed by many courts. See Melrose v. Capital 
City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1998) ("Courts have traditionally interpreted 
fiduciary duties differently for closely[]held corporations as opposed to publicly held corporations 
for which most of the statutory norms were established."). 
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[*P21] As discussed in Angel Investors and Aurora, the form of closely held corporations 
subjects shareholders to distinct challenges in protecting their investment. These core 
characteristics, and other common [***21] elements, lead to what has been referred to as the 
close corporation trap. James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty 
Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239, 
242 (1998); see also F. Hodge O'Neil, Robert B. Thompson, & Blake Thompson, O'Neal and 
Thompson's Close Corporations and LLCs: Law and Practice § 9:2 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that a 
close corporation shareholder "does not have a partner's power to dissolve the enterprise and get 
out" and similarly does not have the "exit option" of selling her shares in a securities market 
available to shareholders of publicly held corporations). Shareholders in close corporations lack a 
ready market for their shares. This means that closely held corporation shareholders have no 
liquidity in their shares, see Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("No outsider would knowingly assume 
the position of the disadvantaged minority."), and have no avenue for price discovery other than 
the costly process of acquiring an independent valuation for the company. Without an available 
market in which to sell their [**156] interest in a company, minority shareholders who 
disagree with the direction [***22] or governance of the close corporation must rely on 
contractual or statutory remedies, which are often nonexistent, impractical, or inadequate. Id. 
This, in effect, leaves the shareholder with no remedy for the abuses and oppression that may 
result due to the small number of shareholders, the frequency of familial and other personal 
relationships, and the likelihood that majority shareholders control the board in close 
corporations. Though the Act provides for dissolution, this is often a drastic remedy that may not 
serve the interest of the complaining shareholder and certainly not the corporation of which he is 
a part owner. 
[*P22] Without a market remedy, shareholders in close corporations are easily subjected to 
freeze outs, squeeze outs, and other forms of oppression, which the Corporation Act aims to 
prevent. Thus, the Massachusetts approach of recognizing broader fiduciary duties in closely held 
corporations better achieves the goals of the Act by stemming shareholder oppression and is the 
appropriate standard for evaluating fiduciary relationships among shareholders in a closely held 
corporation. Our adoption of the Massachusetts standard is a logical extension of our existing 
case [***23] law regarding close corporations, which acknowledges the unique nature of such 
corporations and seeks to protect their shareholders by interpreting the Corporation Act with 
different corporate circumstances in mind. By adopting this broader fiduciary obligation for close 
corporation shareholders, alternative remedies exist for oppressed shareholders, 4 such as an 
equitable claim for dissolution or a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
FOOTNOTES 
j 4 At the time Donahue was decided, Massachusetts did not have a statutory remedy for 
! oppression. Many of the states that have followed suit have enacted minority oppression 
; statutory remedies—usually dissolution—but allow distinct actions for breaches of the 
I Donahue duties. See e.g., Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 2002 NMCA 15, 131 N.M. 544, 
40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Djrawing on our partnership case law, we hold that j 
\ breach of this fiduciary duty can be asserted as an individual claim separate from the 
remedies available under our statutory corporate law for oppressive conduct."); Balvik v. 
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987) (holding that statute governing corporations 
allowed "alternative equitable remedies not specifically stated in the statute"); Baker v. 
; Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 1973) [***24] ("[C] I 
; ourts are not limited to the remedy of dissolution, but may, as an alternative, consider other j 
i appropriate equitable relief."). 
[*P23] Having concluded that ^ " ^ s h a r e h o l d e r s in closely held corporations owe their 
coshareholders fiduciary obligations, we now consider whether the Defendants breached these 
duties in this case. 
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B. A Shareholder Violates His Duty of Utmost Good Faith When He Thwarts Another Shareholder's 
Reasonable Expectations of Benefits Derived From Ownership in the Corporation 
[*P24] " ^ ^ B r e a c h e s of the fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders arise in 
several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These circumstances have been
 ( 
identified as unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations of involvement, and a 
freezeout or squeezeout. James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty 
Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239, 
252 (1998). In all cases there is a common element—a shareholder's investment expectation in a 
close corporation is frustrated by another shareholder's actions. Brodie v. Jordan, 447 Mass. 866, 
857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Mass. 2006) (noting that examples of breaches of [***25] duty 
share the common element of majority shareholders frustrating minority shareholders' 
reasonable expectation of benefit from their ownership of shares); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 
1999 U. III. L. Rev. 517, 520-21 (1999) (arguing that investment model "reconciles the doctrines 
of shareholder oppression and employment at will"); James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider, 
The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 
18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239, 252 (1998). 
[**157] [*P25] Analyzing breach of fiduciary claims in this light, courts have narrowed the 
potentially broad duty espoused by Donahue to a more investment-based analysis. Brodie, 857 
N.E.2d at 1079 (Mass. 2006) ("A number of other jurisdictions . . . also look to shareholders' 
'reasonable expectations' in determining whether to grant relief to an aggrieved minority 
shareholder in a close corporation."). For example, beginning again with Massachusetts, in Wilkes 
v. Springside Nursing Homes, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court described the termination 
of an officer from the close corporation as a squeezeout [***26] that "effectively frustrate[d] 
the minority stockholder's purpose in entering on the corporate venture and also den[ied] him an 
equal return on his investment." 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). The Wilkes 
court then explained the importance of balancing a shareholder's expectations with the 
reasonable and legitimate business interests of the other shareholders. Id. "Therefore, HN13 
Twhen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit . . . alleging a breach of the strict 
good faith duty," courts "must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders 
in the individual case" and ask "whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate 
business purpose for its action." Id. 
[*P26] Under this standard for fiduciary duty protection, the termination of an employee is not 
always a breach of fiduciary duty. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 423 Mass. 461, 668 N.E.2d 351, 
354-55 (Mass. 1996). In Merola the court found the plaintiff's termination was not a breach of 
fiduciary duty because the plaintiffs investment in the corporation was not tied to employment in 
any formal way. Id. Comparing the facts in Merola to the facts in Wilkes, the court noted that in 
Wilkes the policy and practice [***27] of the corporation was to divide the profits of the 
corporation equally by way of salaries to the shareholders who participated in the operation of 
the corporation. This distribution of the company's resources was based on the fact that under 
the corporation's long-standing policy, employment with the corporation went "hand in hand with 
stock ownership." Id. at 354. The corporation in Merola, on the other hand, had no such policy. 
And, while the plaintiff may have expected continued employment, the value of his shares were 
independent of his employment status. Id. This was evidenced by the fact of the increase in the 
value of his stock and a lack of indication that he was required to purchase stock to keep his job. 
Id. The court also noted the plaintiff was not a founding member of the corporation, a fact 
considered by other courts as well. Id. 
[*P27] f / / V i 4 ? " N o t every discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens 
to own stock in the corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim." Id. at 
355. Instead, the court must consider the formal policies and practices of the close corporation, 
and how these policies and practices are interpreted by and impact [***28] all shareholders to 
determine whether or not a shareholder's reasonable expectations were thwarted. As the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has explained, when considering an allegation of oppressive conduct, a 
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court should review 
what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be the petitioner's 
expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct should not be 
deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes and desires in 
joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone should not necessarily be 
equated with oppression. 
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987) (quoting Matter of Kemp & Beatiey, Inc., 
64 l\LY.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)); see also Fox v. 
7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929, 933 (Mont. 1982). This close consideration of 
shareholders' expectations is necessary to ensure that corporations are not crippled and kept 
from efficiently operating their business; it is well accepted that corporate officers "must have a 
large measure of discretion . . . in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge 
or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or 
[***29] without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees." Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
[**158] [*P28] Applying the foregoing principles to this case, we conclude that Cookietree 
did not thwart McLaughlin's investment expectation. McLaughlin was not a founding member who 
created the company with the expectation of employment. Instead, after the corporation wras 
well established, McLaughlin was recruited for his specialized experience in similar industries. His 
primary reason for joining Cookietree was employment. This employment allowed him to 
purchase stock in Cookietree, but he was not required to do so. And, while it is likely that his 
initial stock purchase allowance and the later stock purchase agreement were offered as an 
incentive or reward for McLaughlin's work performance, the purchase allowances were not 
inextricably tied to his employment; they were a separate investment in the company. In 
addition to his stock purchases, and unlike the plaintiff in Wilkes, McLaughlin was paid a 
competitive salary for his contributions to the company. His investment in the company was 
separately rewarded through the payment of dividends, which he continued to receive after his 
termination. Therefore, in terminating [***30] McLaughlin, Schenck 5 did not thwart 
McLaughlin's investment expectations in the company and therefore did not violate any duty 
owed to McLaughlin. 
FOOTNOTES 
5 The district court found that Cookietree, not Schenck, terminated McLaughlin's employment, ! 
and therefore, Schenck was not liable for any damages caused by terminating McLaughlin. 
This was incorrect. Schenck terminated McLaughlin as the president of Cookietree and is 
; liable if in doing so he breached a fiduciary duty, including his duty to discharge both his 
I "management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith 
j standard." Wilkes, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) (quoting Donahue, 328 j 
N.E.2d at 515)); see also Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, P 19, 70 P.3d 35 \ 
("[A]n officer or director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of the corporation or 
j of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur 
; personal liability by participating in the wrongful activity.") (quoting 3A William Meade 
Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1137, at 209 (rev. ed. 
2002)). 
[*P29] McLaughlin also argues that Rosemann and Schenck breached [***31] the fiduciary 
duty they owed to McLaughlin by transferring and later ratifying the stock transaction between 
Anna Schenck and Greg Schenck. This allegation is dependent, however, on McLaughlin's claim 
that the transfer was unlawful; all stock transactions promote the parties' interests, and 
therefore only breach a duty when they are accomplished in an unfair or unlawful manner. 
Therefore, we next consider whether the stock transaction violated Cookietree's corporate charter 
or the Corporation Act. 
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II. THE SCHENCK TRANSACTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE CORPORATE CHARTER OR THE 
CORPORATION ACT, BUT THE WAIVERS WERE TAINTED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
[*P30] The 1991 and 1999 shareholder agreements limit the transfer of shares by imposing 
first rights of refusal on any share transfer. If a shareholder wishes to sell or otherwise transfer 
his shares, the shareholder must first offer Cookietree the opportunity to purchase the shares. If 
Cookietree declines to purchase the stock, then the corporation's shareholders have a right to 
purchase a portion of the offered shares equal to the percentage of the company's shares they 
already own. Under the agreements, "[a]ny sale or transfer . . . shall be null and [***32] void 
unless the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are strictly observed and 
followed." The limitation on share transfers may be waived by a "duly authorized action of 
[Cookietree's] Board of Directors, or by the Shareholders, upon the express written consent of 
the owners of at least two-thirds of the Shares . . . (excluding those Shares owned by the selling 
shareholder)." 
[*P31] The transfer of shares from Anna Schenck to Greg Schenck did not conform to the first 
right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the waivers by the Board and three of 
Cookietree's shareholders were valid. McLaughlin argues that the ratification of the Schenck 
transaction was invalid because the waivers were based on an expired Shareholder Agreement, 
were untimely, violated Cookietree's bylaws, and, in the case of the Board waiver, was a 
conflicting interest transaction under the Corporation [**159] Act. We disagree that the 
waivers were enacted without authority, were untimely, or were in violation of Coookietree's 
bylaws or of statutory conflict of interest provisions. However, we acknowledge the waivers were 
tainted by a conflict of interest and thereby remand for a determination of whether 
[***33] they were fair. 
[*P32] First, the stock transaction between Anna and Greg Schenck is subject to the 1991 
Shareholder Agreement. McLaughlin argues that the waivers were invalid because the initial 
transaction occurred when the 1991 Shareholder Agreement was in effect but the waiver 
occurred after the Agreement was superseded by the 1999 Agreement. Where there was no 
lapse between the two agreements, there was no such contractual no-mans land. The share 
transfer and waiver were part of the same transaction and are governed by either the 1991 
Agreement or the 1999 Agreement, both of which provide for a waiver of the agreement's 
limitations on share transfers. In this case, the transaction occurred in August 1999 and the 1999 
Shareholder Agreement became effective in November 1999. Therefore, the 1991 Agreement is 
the controlling document. Whether the waiver was invalid because it was acquired so long after 
the share transfer is an issue of timeliness, not authority. 
[*P33] Pursuant to the Corporation Act, the waiver was timely. McLaughlin argues the waivers, 
obtained over six years after the stock transfer, could not have been timely as a matter of law, 
and therefore the issue should have been submitted [***34] to a jury. McLaughlin is correct 
that whether or not ratification actually occurred is a question of fact. However, he fails to cite 
any disputed issues of fact that would have prevented the district court from determining the 
question as a matter of law on summary judgment. There is no dispute that the waivers were 
obtained, nor is there a challenge to the date of the waivers or the involved parties. HN15*+Untier 
the Corporation Act, the waivers are effective as of the date indicated by the board of directors in 
the waiver and consent. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-821(2); see also 2A William Meade Fletcher, 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 782 (rev. ed 2009). McLaughlin relies on agency 
law to argue that the Board should not be allowed to execute the waiver and consent after so 
much time had elapsed because it would be unfair and disadvantageous to him. To persuade this 
court to adopt such an equitable principle, McLaughlin must present a developed common law 
principle or a strong policy reason to support its adoption. He has not argued either. Therefore, 
we rely on the plain language of the Corporation Act, which allows the board to act retroactively 
by assigning ex post-facto [***35] effective dates to their actions. As presented to the district 
court, McLaughlin did not present any disputed fact that would foreclose the district court from 
determining as a matter of law that the waivers were timely. 
[*P34] Additionally, the waivers did not violate Cookietree's bylaws. McLaughlin argues the 
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shareholder waiver violated Cookietree's bylaws because the shareholders signed the waivers 
without a noticed shareholder meeting, and that an action taken without a meeting must be 
signed by all the shareholders entitled to vote, whereas he and his wife were not asked to sign. 
The shareholder waiver, however, is governed by the 1991 Shareholder Agreement, which does 
not require the votes of all shareholders entitled to vote, but instead only two-thirds of the 
shareholders. While this may conflict with the bylaws, HN16+the Corporation Act allows a 
corporation to enter a separate shareholder agreement that governs the management and affairs 
of the corporation and the relationships among the shareholders despite a conflict with the 
bylaws so long as it does not violate public policy. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732. Therefore, 
because the shareholder agreement allowed two-thirds of Cookietree's [***36] shareholders to 
waive provisions of the shareholder agreement without a shareholder meeting, the waivers did 
not violate Cookietree's bylaws. 
[*P35] Turning to the Corporation Act, we hold the waivers were not statutory conflict of 
interest transactions within its terms. McLaughlin argues the waivers were conflict of interest 
transactions because each [**160] of the board members that signed the waiver had a conflict 
of interest. We agree with Greg Schenk's argument that the statute does not apply. Under the 
Corporation Act, HN17m¥a person is considered to have a conflict of interest if he has an interest 
in "a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation or by any entity in which 
the corporation has a controlling interest." Id. § 16-10a-850(l) (emphasis added). In this case, 
the statute does not apply to the waiver because it was not itself a transaction. As explained by 
the comments to the Model Business Corporation Act, which the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act adopted, a transaction is a two-sided deal, not a unilateral action by the 
corporation. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch. 8-F, introductory cmt. (2009). The waiver, as enacted 
by the board of directors, was a unilateral [***37] action by Cookietree, not a "deal"; 
therefore, it is not subject to the conflict of interest statute. Id. 
[*P36] This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. H i V i 8 ? M Many situations arise in 
which a director's [or shareholder's] personal economic interest is or may be adverse to the 
economic interest of the corporation, but which do not entail a 'transaction' by or with the 
corporation." Id. These situations are no less concerning because on the surface they appear to 
suffer from the same lack of probity and fair dealing as statutory conflict of interest transactions. 
The law does not ignore such troubling circumstances, but instead leaves the treatment of such 
situations "for development under the common law." Id. The Model Act suggests the procedures 
designed to deal with statutory conflicts of interest provide a useful strategy for dealing with such 
situations as a matter of common law. Id. We agree. 6 
FOOTNOTES 
6 The statutory conflict of interest provisions address the same concerns presented by 
nontransaction conflicts of interest. Nontransaction conflicts of interest, however, are much 
less common in publicly held corporations and therefore because the Corporation Act was 
drafted in the context [***38] of such corporations, see supra P 20, it fails to address such 
situations. 
[*P37] The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most appropriately address 
nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not automatically invalidate conflict of 
interest transactions but instead require the party with a conflict to show the transaction was 
fair, or require the vote of disinterested board members or disinterested shareholders to ratify 
the transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851 (2005). In adopting these procedures for 
nontransaction-related conflicts, we recognize that many aspects of corporate governance are 
unfair. However, as close corporation case law repeatedly notes, close corporations are ripe for 
abuse and oppression of minority shareholders, especially when majority shareholders are 
commonly both directors and board members. The conflict of interest statute protects against 
such abuse, but still preserves the ability of close corporations to operate by not invalidating 
every transaction with a conflict of interest. 
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[*P38] Applying this standard, we conclude the waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were 
tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both [***39] executed by Greg Schenck, 
who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the shareholder 
agreement that were ignored when he received the shares by which he gained majority control of 
Cookietree. By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenck and the other board 
members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the nonvoting shareholders of the 
economic opportunity to increase their investment in the corporation. Corporate law is wary of 
such self-dealing. Cookietree's shareholder agreement also was wary of such activities and 
excluded sellers from voting on waiving the restrictions on share transfers. The agreement failed, 
however, to foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate 
shareholder and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers. We therefore remand for a 
determination of whether the waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-
851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to the 
corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing. See 
Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch.8-F, § 8.60. 
[**161] III. A [***40] TRIAL COURT MAY DENY A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND WHEN 
THE AMENDMENT WAS FUTILE 
[*P39] In its Ruling and Order, the district court did not dismiss McLaughlin's fiduciary duty 
claim but rejected the grounds on which he pled the claim, leaving open the opportunity to 
amend the complaint so long as he met the burden of alleging new facts and evidence that would 
support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty that had not already been addressed by the court. 
When McLaughlin submitted an amended complaint that added two additional parties but relied 
on largely the same facts, the district court denied this motion. 
[*P40] HN19li?\Nhen considering a motion to amend, the district court should primarily consider 
whether the motion would cause unavoidable prejudice to the opposing party. Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998). In addition, the district 
court may also consider "delay, bad faith, or futility of the amendment." Id. In this case, the 
district court correctly held that McLaughlin's proposed amended complaint would have been 
futile as the court already determined that interparty contracts barred the existence of any duty 
owed to McLaughlin in relation to the complained [***41] of acts. A party cannot obtain a 
different outcome by adding to the parties or rephrasing claims. 
[*P41] McLaughlin argues the district court had only ruled on fiduciary duties arising out of 
existing contracts and that his amended complaint raised tort-based theories of fiduciary duties. 
This is an inaccurate characterization of the district court's determination and, moreover, a 
distinction without a difference. Regardless of how McLaughlin phrases his claims, they are the 
same theory: Cookietree shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to McLaughlin by waiving the 
right of refusal for the 1999 stock transaction and by terminating his employment. Whether this 
theory is characterized as arising out of contract or tort, it is the same theory--a tort for breach 
of duty. Thus, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion because McLaughlin's 
amendment failed to state new facts or a new theory that had not already been addressed by the 
court; an amendment would have been futile. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P42] We agree with McLaughlin that shareholders in close corporations stand in fiduciary 
positions to one another and are required to act with the utmost good faith. However, we also 
note this duty [***42] is not unlimited but instead must be balanced with the legitimate 
business interest of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of individual shareholders. 
In this case, however, we hold that McLaughlin's reasonable expectations were not thwarted 
when he was terminated from Cookietree, and therefore, the defendants did not breach any 
fiduciary duties owed him. The district court's decision on this issue is affirmed. Additionally, we 
affirm the district court's decision to deny McLaughlin's attempt to amend his complaint to add 
additional parties as futile because he could not prove his legal theory by adding individuals to 
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the litigation. Finally, we conclude that the waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were 
contaminated by a conflict of interest and remand for a determination of whether the waivers 
were fair. 
[*P43] Associate Chief Justice Durrant • , Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish ^, and District Judge 
Hadfield • concur in Chief Justice Durham Vs opinion. 
[*P44] Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring • does not participate herein; District: Judge 
Ben H. Hadfield * sat. 
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iMINUTES OF A MEETING 
OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS III 
COOKIETREE, INC. 
Friday, December 18,2009 • 
\ meeting of the board of directors (the "Board") of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(the "Company"), was held on Friday, December 18,2009, commencing at 4:00 p.m. MST at the 
offices of Ballard Spahr, LLP, 201 South Main Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Present at and participating in the meeting were all three members of the Board, Greg F. Schenk, 
Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd. Also present was Brian R. Innes, the Company's 
corporate legal counsel, Mr, Schenk acted as chairman of the meeting. Mr. Rosemann acted as 
secretary of the meeting and asked Mr. Innes to prepare these minutes. 
Each of the directors waived notice of the time, place, and purposes ofthe meeting to 
which he might have been entitled and consented to the conduct of the business of the meeting. 
u n • . ' • i*dj ig to oi der. 
The 1999 Stock Transfer From Anna Schenk to Crcg Schenk 
I he directors discussed the sale of 545^200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company 
by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that took place in August 1999 (the "Stock Sale") and the 
waiver in 2005 of the provisions, including the stock transfer restriction provisions (other than 
paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement between the Company and the shareholders 
of the Company who signed the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement that was authorized by the Board 
~in 2005 (the "2005 Board Waiver") and the separate written waiver of such provisions executed 
in 2005 by certain shareholders of the Company. In that context, the directors discussed the Utah 
Supreme Court opinion in the litigation brought against the Company and others, including Greg 
Schenk, by Sam McLaughlin. The directors noted that the Utah Supreme Court held that both 
waivers were tainted because Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest and participated in the 
giving of each of the waivers. Because of the action of the I Ftah Supreme Comt, the directors 
unanimously determined that it is advisable for the board to consider whether to ratify the 2005 
Board Waiver and to authorize and approve a new waiver of the provisions, including the stock 
transfer restriction provisions (other than paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders5 Agreement, 
and to the extent applicable, the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement 
between the Company and the shareholders of the Company to the Stock Sale. 
111 the course the directors' discussion of the matter, Greg Schenk acknowledged the 
personal benefit that he would receive from the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver arid from 
the authorization and approval of a new waiver and that said personal benefit created for him a 
conflict of interest. Greg Schenk stated that because of that conflict of interest he intended to 
abstain from voting on any action concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver and the 
authorization of a current waiver. 
Harold Rosemann stated that although he did not believe that his status as an employee of 
the Company would exert any influence on his vote as a director, he did acknowledge that his 
relationship with Greg Schenk likely could have an influence on his vote and create a conflict of 
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interest for him in voting. Therefore, Harold Rosemann stated that because of that conflict of 
interest he also intended to abstain from voting on the issue of the ratification of the 2005 Board 
Waiver or the authorization of a current waiver. 
i 
Following a detailed discussion concerning the matters before the directors, David Rudd, 
the sole disinterested member of the Board, acknowledged that he, like the other directors, had 
received and reviewed the disclosure document describing the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the 20O5 Board Waiver and the issues associated with authorizing a new waiver and 
also acknowledged that he was otherwise aware of the details of the conflict of interest of Greg 
Schenk. The directors determined to put the matter of the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver 
and the issue of whether to authorize and approve a current waiver of the provisions, including 
the stock transfer restriction provisions (other than paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement, and to the extent applicable, the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders1 
Agreement to the Stock Sale before the disinterested director and in that regard it was: 
RESOLVED: That the directors acknowledge the full disclosure by Greg Schenk 
of his non-transactional conflict of interest with respect to past or present action 
taken or to be taken by the Board by and on behalf of the Company to ratify the 
waiver by the Board in 2005 (by written consent dated effective as of August 15, 
2005) on behalf of the Company of the provisions, including the stock transfer 
provisions (other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to 
the August 1999 sale by Anna Schenk of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of 
the Company to Greg Schenk (the "Stock Sale") or concerning any action by the 
Board to presently act by and on behalf of the Company to waive such provisions 
in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable in the 1999 
Shareholders'Agreement. 
- - RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the disinterested director ratifies and confirms 
in all respects the action of the directors by and on behalf of the Company taken 
by their written consent effective as of August 15, 1999 to waive the application 
of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (in particular the stock 
transfer limitation provisions (other than paragraph 10)) to the Stock Sale. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the disinterested director presently waives, bv 
and on behalf of the Company, the application of the provisions of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions (other than 
paragraph 10) and, to the extent applicable, the provisions of the 1999 
Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions (other than 
paragraph 10), to the Stock Sale. 
Greg F. Schenk and Harold W. Rosemann abstained from voting on the foregoing 
resolutions and David R. Rudd voted in favor of the resolutions. 
Ratification of Action by the Sole Disinterested Director 
The directors discussed the advisability of the entire Board considering and to the extent 
appropriate ratifying the actions concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver and the 
authorization of a new waiver of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, in 
particular the stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10) and, to the extent applicable, 
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the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions 
(other than paragraph 10), to the Stock Sale and to that end following a discussion, unanimously: 
RESOLVED: That all actions taken by David R. Rudd, in his capacity as a 
director of the Company, to ratify the waiver by the Board in 2005 (by written 
consent dated effective as of August 15,1999) on behalf of the Company of the 
provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10), of 
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to the Stock Sale be and are ratified and 
confirmed in all respects. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: I hat all actions taken by David R. Rudd, in his 
capacity as a director of the Company, to presently waive, on behalf of the 
Company, application of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions 
(other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements, and to the 
extent applicable in the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale, be and 
are ratified and confirmed in all respects. 
^nareholders 
Tlit: <iiru-;i)rs discussed the need to hold the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of 
the Company and unanimously agreed that it is advisable to establish the date, time, location and 
record date for the annual meeting and to that end \ inanini- msly: 
RESOLVED That the 2009 annual rneeuny. *i -i<- shareholders of the Company 
is called for and shall be held at 4:00 pin M> ! > i January 6, 2009, at the offices 
of Stoel Rives, LLP, One I huh Center, 20! Mil \ I -n Street, Suite ! 100, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the matters of business to come ocioic r.h- .. y 
annual meeting of the shareholders of the Company shall be (i) the election 
three directors to the Board of Directors of the Company, (ii) ratification of the 
appointment ot 1aiiiier LC as the auditor of the Company, (iii) waiver of the 
application of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other than 
paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and to the extent applicable 
of the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale 
by the shareholders of the Company, (iv) ratification of the waiver contemplated 
in (iii) above and the waiver executed in 2005 by certain of the then shareholders 
of the Company of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other 
than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to the Stock Sale and 
of the waiver, if any, by the shareholders of the Company at the annual meeting 
who own ''qualified shares" of the application of the provisions, including the 
stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement and to the extent applicable of the similar provisions of the 1999 
Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale; and (v) any other business that 
properly conies before the meeting. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: I hat shareholders of the Company of record as of 
the close of business on December 18, 2009 (the "Record Date"), shall be the only 
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shareholders of the Company entitled to notice of and to vote at the 2009 annual 
meeting of the shareholders. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the Secretary of the Company be, and he is, 
authorized, empowered, and directed to send notice and other relevant 
information to the shareholders as of the Record Date, and to solicit proxies from 
them on behalf of the Board of Directors for the meeting, such notice and other 
relevant information to be mailed on a date in compliance with the bylaws of the 
Company and applicable law. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That if any officer of the Company shall determine 
that it is necessary and reasonable to change any or all of the date, time or 
location of the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of the Company, each 
such officer shall be, and is, authorized, empowered, and directed to make such 
changes and to take all of the actions that are necessary or advisable to fully 
implement any such changes. 
Nomination of Candidates for Election to the Board of Directors 
The directors discussed the appointment of candidates for election to the Board at the 
2009 annual meeting of the shareholders. It was noted in the discussion that the terms of Greg F. 
Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd will expire at the 2009 annual meeting. 
Following a discussion, the directors unanimously agreed that it is advisable and in the best 
interests of the Company that Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd be 
nominated as candidates for election as a director of the Company to serve as such until the 2010 
annual meeting of the shareholders and until their successors are duly elected and to that end the 
directors unanimously: 
RESOLVED: That each of Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. 
Rudd be and each of them is nominated to stand as a candidate of the Company 
for election as a director to the board of directors of the Company to serve as 
such, if elected, until the 2010 annual meeting of shareholders of the Company 
and until his successor is duly elected. 
Selection of Auditor 
The directors discussed the work done by the auditor of and independent accountants to 
the Company, and unanimously selected Tanner LC as such for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 2010, and determined that it was advisable to submit the selection of Tanner LC as the 
Company's auditors to the shareholders for ratification at the 2009 annual meeting of the 
shareholders of the Company, and that that end unanimously: 
RESOLVED: That Tanner LC be and is selected as the auditor of and 
independent accountants to the Company for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
2010. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the selection of Tanner LC as the auditor of and 
independent accountants to the Company for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
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2010 be submitted to the shareholders for ratification at the 2009 annual meeting 
of the shareholders of the Company. 
Appointment of Inspector of Election/Voting 
Following a discussion, die directors unanimously agreed to appoint Harold W. 
Rosemann as the inspector of election/voting and judge for the 2009 annual meeting of the 
shareholders of the Company and to that end unanimously; 
RESOLVED: That for the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of the 
Company and for all meetings of the shareholders of the Company held during 
2010, Harold W. Rosemann be and is appointed to act as the inspector of 
election/voting and, in such capacity, to serve as the judge for the voting, 
including the tabulation of the results of any votes by the shareholders of the 
Company at any si ich meetings. 
Omnibus Resolutions 
In furtherance of the lore directors unanimously: 
RESOLVED: That all actions heretofore taken and expenses incurred by any 
officer or director of the Company in furtherance of any of the actions authorized 
by the foregoing resolutions are hereby ratified, confirmed, adopted and 
approved, in all respects. 
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That each of the officers of the Company be, find is, 
authorized, directed, and empowered in the name of and on behalf of the 
Company, to execute, certify, deliver, file and record such other agreements, 
instruments, certificates and other writings, and to take such actions as such 
officer may deem necessary or advisable to carry out the intent and purposes of 
the foregoing resolutions, such determination to be conclusively evidenced by 
such action, execution, certification, delivery, filing or recording. 
Adjournment of Meeting 
[here being no further business to come before the meeting n -j. 
unanimously approved, adjourned at approximately 4:20 p.m. MST. 
Harold W, Rosemann 
Secretary 
T ^ 
ATTEJ 
'ureg F. Jichenk 
President 
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December 21, 2009 
Dea r Shai eholder, 
I have enclosed the notice of the 2009 annual shareholders meeting that will be held 
«MI January 6, 2010, a disclosure document explaining two special proposals that will 
be voted on at the meeting and a proxy for those not able to attend the meeting in 
person If applicable, please return the proxy as soon as possible. Please note that you 
should have already received a copy of the audited financial statements and your 
Schedule K-1 for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2009. 
Thank von !<•? \ i •» T IK!|\ «' •,«, «IJ have any questions please call me. 
Sincerely, 
I laroic \ <i'^v\*vi\\ 
(Corporate Secretary 
Cookietree, Inc. 
: ), iltl aki : 503019,5 0061604-00002 
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COOKIETREE, INC. 
4122 South 500 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 
TO BE HELD ON JANUARY 6, 2010 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Annual Meeting of the Shareholders of Cookietree, 
Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), will be held at the offices of Stoel Rives, LLP located at 
One Utah Center, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on Wednesday, 
January 6, 2010 at 4:00 P.M. local time, for the following purposes: 
L To elect the three members of the Company's Board of Directors. 
2. To ratify the selection of Tanner LC as the independent auditor for the Company. 
3. To consider waiving the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the 
extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions 
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by 
Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 1"). 
4. To consider ratifying (1) the waiver by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 
2005 of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the 
Shareholders of the Company as contemplated by Proposal 1 above of the provisions of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, 
including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the 
Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 
("Proposal 2"). 
5. To transact such other business as may properly come before the Annual Meeting or 
any adjournment or adjournments of the Annual Meeting. 
Holders of record at the close of business on December 18, 2009 (the "Record Date"), are entitled to 
notice of and to vote at the Annual Meeting. The number of outstanding shares on the Record Date 
was 4,124,650. 
A form of proxy ("Proxy") is enclosed with this notice. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ATTEND 
T H E ANNUAL MEETING AND VOTE IN PERSON, PLEASE COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE EXNCLOSED 
PROXY AND RETURN IT PROMPTLY IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE. 
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A valid Proxy will be voted at the Annual Meeting in accordance with the instructions in the 
Proxy. If you execute a Proxy and are able to attend the .Annual Meeting, you may. if you wish, 
revoke the Proxy and vote personally on all matters brought before the Annual Meeting. Your 
Proxy may be revoked through written notification to Harold W, Rosemann, the Secretary of the 
Company, by executing a Proxy bearing a later date, or by attending the Annual Meeting and 
affirmatively electing to vote in person. A Shareholder who attends the Annual Meeting need not 
revoke his or her Proxy and vote in person unless he or she wishes to do so. 
The Annual Meeting may be adjourned from time to time as the Shareholders present n lay 
determine. 
i > r ) | i - i i : > ' • , | ^ \ Y\ 
^/A^t r A < ^ r 
Harold W. Rosemann 
Corporate Secretary 
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INFORMATION STATEMENT CONCERNING PROPOSALS 1 AND 2 
•
 t 
The following information is provided to the Shareholders of the Company to enable 
them to better evaluate and determine how to vote on Proposals 1 and 2 at the Annual Meeting. 
Background 
Greg Schenk and his father, Boyd Schenk, were among the original shareholders of 
Cookietree, Inc. (the "Company"). Greg Schenk is currently the President of the Company, a 
member of the Company's Board of Directors (the "Board"), and owns a majority of the issued 
and outstanding shares of the Common Stock (the "Common Stock") of the Company. Anna 
Schenk was married to Boyd Schenk at the time of his death and is Greg Schenk's stepmother. 
On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued stock certificate 11 representing 
1,363,200 shares of the Common Stock. On March 26, 1998, Boyd Schenk surrendered 
certificate 11 to the Company, which cancelled the certificate, and the Company issued 
replacement certificates 17 and 18 representing 818,000 shares and 545,200 shares of the 
Common Stock, respectively, to Boyd Schenk. On April 1, 1998, Boyd Schenk transferred the 
818,000 shares of the Common Stock represented by certificate 17 to Greg Schenk. 
On November 28, 1998, Boyd Schenk died. At the time of his death, Boyd Schenk 
owned the 545,200 shares of the Common Stock represented by certificate 18 and those shares 
became part of the estate of Boyd Schenk. On or about August 16, 1999, approximately nine 
months after Boyd Schenk's deathr Anna Schenk^olithe 545,200 shares of the Common Stock: 
represented by certificate 18 (the "Boyd Schenk Shares'') to Greg Schenk for $272,600 pursuant 
to a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Stock Sale"). 
The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement 
On January 28, 1991, the then shareholders of the Company, including Boyd and Greg 
Schenk, executed a Shareholders' Agreement (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement"). A copy of 
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement is attached as Exhibit A. Among other things, the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement governed the conditions upon which a Shareholder could transfer his 
or her shares. Paragraph 2 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement granted a right of first refusal in 
favor of the Company and the other Shareholders in the event a Shareholder elected to sell some 
or all of his or her shares of the Common Stock. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, the Company would have 30 days following its receipt of the notice of 
intent to sell within which to purchase some or all of the shares specified in the notice at a 
purchase price determined as provided in paragraph 7 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement. If 
the Company decided not to purchase all of the shares, the Shareholders were then given the 
option to purchase their pro rata portion of the shares not purchased by the Company. 
The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement contains two exceptions to the share transfer 
restrictions mentioned in the above paragraph. The first of the two exceptions, found in 
1 
n^l.S^ 
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paragraph 9 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, allows Shareholders to transfer their shares of 
the Common Stock to members of their immediate family. 
rhe second exception is found in paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, 
vi hit/h reads as follows; . 
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with respect to any transfer 
either by Cookietree, upon duly authorized action of its Board of Directors, or by the 
Shareholders, upon the express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of 
the Shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned by the 
selling Shareholder). 
The McLaughlin Litigation 
On or about November 24, 2004, Sam McLaughlin filed a lawsuit in the Third District 
Court in Salt Lake County (the "McLaughlin Lawsuit") against Greg Schenk, the Estate of Boyd 
Schenk, Anna Schenk, and the Company (collectively, the "Defendants") in which he alleged, 
among other allegations, that the Stock Sale was made in violation of the transfer restriction 
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and that the Stock Sale was a "director's 
conflicting interest transaction" as defined in section 851 of the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act (the "Business Corporation Act").1 
The 2005 Waivers 
On May 17, 2005, the Board adopted a resolution by means of a unanimous written 
consent of the members of the Board concerning the Stock Sale, rhe resolution waived the 
application of all restrictions on transfer in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, except the 
restriction in Paragraph 10, (the Transfer Restriction Provisions") to the Stock Sale. On May 
17, 2005, the then owners of more than two-thirds of the shares of the Common Stock subject to 
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares previously owned by 
Anna Schenk, executed a Waiver and Consent that waived the application of the Transfei: 
Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale. 
On the basis of the May 17, 2005 action by the Board and by the then Shareholders of the 
Company who owned greater than two-thirds of the shares of the Common Stock subject to the 
1991 Shareholders1 Agreement (collectively, the "2005 Waivers"), Greg Schenk took the 
position that the transfer and sale by Anna Schenk to him of the Boyd Schenk Shares was not in 
violation of the 1991 Shareholders'Agreement. 
1 Sam McLaughlin had also initiated other lawsuits against the Company. Some of the claims in the McLaughlin 
f awsiijt were resolved by arbitration between the Company and Mr. McLaughlin. 
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Continuation of The McLaughlin Litigation 
After the execution of the 2005 Waivers, Sam McLaughlin claimed in the McLaughlin 
Lawsuit that the 2005 Waivers were invalid because Greg Schenk voted for the 2005 Waivers 
and had a conflict of interest. The Defendants moved for Summary Judgment in the trial court 
on the basis that, among other things, the Stock Sale was not in violation of the 1991 
Shareholders Agreement because the Transfer Restriction Provisions had been validly waived. 
The trial court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Sam McLaughlin 
appealed the decision of the trial court to the Utah Supreme Court where he argued, among other 
things, that the 2005 Waivers were invalid because they were based on an expired shareholders' 
agreement (the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement was replaced in 1999 by a new Shareholders' 
Agreement (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement)), were untimely, violated the Company's 
bylaws, and, in the case of the action taken by the Board on May 17, 2005 by unanimous written 
consent, was a conflicting interest transaction under Part 8 of the Business Corporation Act. On 
October 2, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court tiled its opinion. A copy of the full opinion is attached 
as Exhibit B. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement controlled the 
Stock Sale and that pursuant to the Business Corporation Act the 2005 Waivers were timely. 
(Opinion of the Utah Supreme Court dated October 2, 2009 (the "Opinion") at ffif 33, 34.) The 
Utah Supreme Court also held that the 2005 Waivers did not violate the Company's bylaws and 
that neither of the 2005 Waivers constituted a "director's conflicting interest transaction" under 
the Business Corporation Act. (Opinion at ffl[ 34, 35.) However, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the 2005-Waivers-t - were-tainted by a confl ictof interest because they were both 
executed by Greg Schenk, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer 
restrictions of the [1991] shareholders'] agreement. . . ." (Opinion at 1j 38.) 
Greg Schenk's Conflict of Interest 
As noted, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the 2005 Waivers were "tainted by 
[Greg Schenk's] conflict of interest" and thus ineffective to waive the application of the Transfer 
Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale because Greg Schenk executed each of them when "he 
clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the [1991] 
shareholders'] agreement." (Opinion at j^ 38.) The 2005 Waivers were executed on May 17, 
2005 and as indicated, at that time Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest in seeking the 2005 
Waivers because of his economic interest in having the Transfer Restriction Provisions waived as 
concerns the Stock Sale. 
Resolution of the Conflict of Interest by Director Action or by Shareholder Action 
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the McLaughlin Lawsuit that 
neither of the 2005 Waivers constituted a "director's conflicting interest transaction." (Opinion 
at If 35.) The Court so ruled because under the Business Corporation Act neither of the 2005 
Waivers "was itself a transaction." (Opinion at f 35). However, the Court stated that the Model 
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Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act"), on which the Business Corporation Act was based, 
suggests that the procedures in the Model Act for dealing with a director's conflicting interest 
transaction provide a useful approach for resolving a director's nontransactional conflict of 
interest, such as the conflict of interest of Greg Schenk, as a matter of common law. (Opinion at 
Tf 36.) Thus, the Utah Supreme Court said that: 
The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most appropriately 
address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not automatically 
invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with a conflict 
to show the transaction was fair, or require the vote of disinterested board 
members or disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction. (Emphasis 
added.) (Opinion at 137.) 
Greg Schenk has requested that the Board and the Shareholders vote on whether or not to 
waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions, pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement and sections 852 and 853 of the Business Corporation Act \t the Annual Meeting, 
the Shareholders will be asked to (1) ratify the May 17, 2005 action of the then shareholders of 
the Company and the new waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the Stock Sale; and 
(2) execute a present waiver of the Fransfer Restriction Provisions with respect to the Stock Sale 
At a meeting of the Board held on December 18, 2009, a majority of Hie "disinterested" 
members of the Board has previously taken action to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver and to 
presently waive the Fransfer Restriction Provisions, as concerns the Stock Sale, and the Board 
recommends the..adoption- bythe Shareholders^ f-Proposals-1 and 2. 
Although sections 852(3) and 853(2) permitted or permit Greg Schenk to be present at 
the meeting of the Board and the meeting of the Shareholders at which the matters referred to 
above were or are to be voted on and to vote as a member of the Board and as a Shareholder of • 
the Company, respectively at those meetings, and Greg Schenk was in attendance at the 
December 18, 2009 meeting of the Board, Greg Schenk abstained from voting at the meeting on 
the matters referred to in the above paragraph. Greg Schenk intends to be present at the Annual 
Meeting and to vote the Shares of the Common Stock owned by him, other than the Boyd 
Schenk Shares, onl> on Proposal 1. Greg Schenk will not vote on Proposal 2. 
" *>i HiUiH! SM.AP I '• iVith Respect to Proposals 1 and 2. 
Because of his conflict of interest in seeking waiver of the Transfer Restriction 
Provisions, and because the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement and in the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement require that a such a waiver be approved 
by "the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding 
those Shares owned by the selling Shareholder)," Proposal 1 will be approved only if it is 
approved by (1) Shareholders owning a majority of the Shares of the Common Stock that 
constitute "qualified shares" under the Business Corporation Act; and (2) by the owners of at 
least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares of the Common Stock as of the 
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Record Date, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares. Proposal 2 will be approved only if it is 
approved by Shareholders owning a majority of the Shares of the Common Stock that 
constitute "qualified shares" under the Business Corporation Act. 
"Qualified shares" is defined in section 102(27) of the Business Corporation Act to 
include all shares of the Common Stock entitled to vote on Proposals 1 and 2 "except a share: 
(a) that, to the knowledge, before the vote, of the secretary, other officer, or agent of the 
[Company] authorized to tabulate votes [in the case of the Company at the Annual Meeting, 
Harold W. Rosemann, the secretary of the Company], is beneficially owned; or (b) the voting 
of which is controlled, by: (i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting [Proposal 1 
or 2]; (ii) a related person of that director2:; or (iii) a person referred to in . . . (i) and (ii).w 
As noted, Greg Schenk has been determined to have a conflict of interest with respect to 
Proposals 1 and 2. Therefore, to the extent the vote of the Shareholders on Proposals 1 and 2 
is intended to approve the Stock Sale in spite of that conflict of interest, each of the proposals 
must be approved by the owners of a majority of the shares of the Common Stock without 
taking into account any of such shares owned by Greg Schenk and his vote on either of the 
proposals. A list of the owners of the shares of the Common Stock that are "qualified shares" 
will be available at the Annual Meeting and at the offices of the Company for not less than ten 
days preceding the date of the Annual Meeting. 
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and of the 1999 Shareholders' 
Agreement requires that any waiver of the provisions of either such agreement given by the 
Shareholders must be given by athe express written consent of the owners of at least two-
thirds of the Shares^then -subject-to- this Agreement (exeluding^hose-Share^owned bjrthe 
Selling Shareholder)." Therefore, to constitute a waiver by the Shareholders of the Transfer 
Restriction Provisions in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and to the extent applicable in the 
1999 Shareholders' Agreement3, Proposal 1 must be approved by not less than two-thirds of 
all of the issued and outstanding shares of the Common Stock (excluding the Boyd Schenk 
Shares). 
Consequences if the Board and the Shareholders Determine not to Waive the Provisions of 
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement With Respect to the Stock Sale 
Paragraph 12 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement provides as follows: 
Any sale or transfer, or purported sale or transfer, of Cookietree Shares shall 
be null and void unless the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are 
strictly observed and followed. 
2 Section 102(31) of the Business Corporation Act defines "related person" to include "(a) the spouse of the 
director; (b) a child, grandchild, sibling, or parent of the director; (c) the spouse of a child, grandchild, sibling, or 
parent of the director; (d) an individual having the same home as the director; (e) a trust or estate of which the 
director or any other individual specified in this Subsection (31) is a substantial beneficiary; or (0 a trust, estate, 
incompetent, conservatee, or minor of which the director is a fiduciary," 
3 The stock transfer restrictions in the 1991 and 1999 Shareholders' Agreements are the same. 
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In its opinion in the McLaughlin Lawsuit, the Utah Supreme Court stated that at the time 
the Stock Sale was made, "it violated the 1991 Shareholders'] Agreement." (Opinion at If 6.) If 
the Board and the Shareholders were to determine to take none of the actions requested by Greg 
Schenk (referred to above and outlined in greater detail below) and if Greg Schenk determined 
not to attempt otherwise to show that the 2005 Waivers were fair within the meaning of section 
851 of the Business Corporation Act or having attempted to do so was unsuccessful in that effort, 
the Stock Sale would be null and void and of no effect, the Boyd Schenk Shares would be 
returned by Greg Schenk to Anna Schenk, and appropriate financial arrangements would be 
made and entered into between Greg Schenk and Anna Schenk as a result of the of the undoing 
of the Stock Sale, . 
PROPOSAL 1 
PRESENT WAIVER OF THE TRANSFER RESTRICTION PROVISIONS IN THE 1991 
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT AND THE 1999 SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT 
Effect of a Present Waiver 
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and the 1999 Shareholders' 
Agreement gives the Shareholders (other than the selling Shareholder) the right to waive the 
application of the agreement to a sale or transfer of shares of the Company. You should vote 
"For" Proposal 1 if you believe that it is appropriate that the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' 
^greenLent,^ 
including, in each case, the stock transfer restrictions of the agreement (other than Paragraph 10) 
should not apply to the Stock Sale and you are willing to execute the written consent referred to 
ii i Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement. In 
deciding how to vote, you should consider, among other things, whether waiving the Transfer 
Restriction Provisions would be fair to the Company and the Shareholders. 
It a piesent waiver is approved, Greg Schenk will be allowed to keep the Boyd Schenk 
Shares sold to him in the Stock Sale, the Stock Sale will not he null and void and the Boyd 
Schenk Shares v-i" . -c • cturned to Anna Schenk. 
necommendation of Board of Directors 
Approval of Proposal 1 requires the affirmative vote of a majonty of the qualified shares 
and the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of all the issued and outstanding shares of the 
Common Stock, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares. 
The Disinterested V *)] Directors recommends a vote FOR Proposal 1. 
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PROPOSAL 2 
RATIFICATION OF THE MAY 17, 2005 AND PRESENT 2010 SHAREHOLDER 
WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE TRANSFER RESTRICTION PROVISIONS IN THE 
1991 AND 1999 SHAREHOLDERS'AGREEMENTS 
Effect of Ratification of the 2005 and 2010 Shareholder Waivers 
The Shareholders who hold qualified shares of the Company's Common Stock are being 
asked to vote to ratify (1) the May 17, 2005 waiver by the then Shareholders of the application of 
the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Shareholder Waiver"); and (2) 
the present waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991, and to the extent 
applicable, the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement (as contemplated by Proposal 1) to the Stock Sale 
(the "2010 Shareholder Waiver"). You should vote "For" Proposal 2 if you believe that it is 
appropriate that the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991, and to the extent applicable, the 
1999 Shareholders' Agreement should not apply to the Stock Sale. In deciding how to vote, you 
should consider, among other things, whether the 2005 Shareholder Wavier and the 2010 
Shareholder Waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions are fair to the Company and the 
Shareholders. 
If the 2005 Shareholder Waiver and the 2010 Shareholder Waiver are ratified Greg 
Schenk will be allowed to keep the Boyd Schenk Shares sold to him in the Stock Sale, the Stock 
Sale will not be null and void and the Boyd Schenk Shares will not be returned to Anna Schenk. 
Vote Requirement and Recommendation 
Ratification of both the 2005 Shareholder Waiver and the 2010 Shareholder Waiver 
requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of the Common Stock of the Company 
that are qualified shares. 
The Disinterested Member of the Board of Directors recommends a vote FOR Proposal 2. 
OTHER BUSINESS 
The Board of Directors is not aware of any matters to be presented at the Annual Meeting 
other than those described herein and in the accompanying Proxy. However, the enclosed Proxy 
gives discretionary authority to the management of the Company to vote on any other matters 
that properly come before the Annual Meeting. 
SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS 
If you will not be able to attend the Annual Meeting in person and wish to vote on the 
above matters, or if you will attend the Annual Meeting and wish to give your proxy to 
management of the Company, please complete, date, and sign the enclosed Proxy and return it in 
the enclosed envelope. 
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EXHIBIT A 
1991 SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT 
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EXHIBIT B 
OPINION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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PROXY 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SHAREHOLDERS 
JANUARY 6, 2010 
THIS PROXY IS SOLICITED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The undersigned hereby appoints Harold W. Rosemann, with full power of substitution, 
as attorney and proxy of the undersigned to vote and otherwise represent all of the shares of the 
Common Stock of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), registered in the name 
of the undersigned at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held at the offices of Stoel Rives, 
LLP located at One Utah Center, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
Wednesday, January 6, 2010 at 4:00 P.M. and any adjournments thereof, with the same effect as 
if the undersigned were present and voting the shares on all matters set forth in the Notice and 
Information Statement, a copy of which has been received by the undersigned, as follows: 
1. The election of the following nominees as directors of the Company, each to serve until 
the next Annual Meeting of Shareholders or until a successor shall be duly elected and 
qualified, or until their earlier resignation or removal. 
Greg F. Schenk 
JQawdJUGLiidcL 
[ ] For [ ] Against [ ] Abstain 
{ | For f } Against —f—}-A bstairr 
Harold W. Rosemann [ ] For [ ] Against [ ] Abstain 
To ratify the appointment of Tanner LC as the independent auditor for the Company. 
[ ] For [ ] Against [ ] Abstain 
To waive the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent 
applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions 
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the 
Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 1"). 
[ ]For [ ] Against [ ] Abstain 
To ratify (1) the waiver by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the 
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the 
Shareholders of the Company as contemplated by Proposal 1 above of the provisions of 
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 
Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 
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10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk 
to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 2"). 
[ ] For [ ] Against [ ] Abstain 
My proxy is further authorized to vote such shares "For" or "Against" any other matter or 
proposal that properly comes before the Annual Meeting, or any adjournment or adjournments 
thereof as he, in his sole discretion may determine. I ratify and confiirm all acts my proxy may do 
or cause to be done by virtue of this proxy and I revoke all proxies previously given by me for 
any meeting of the shareholders of the Company. 
WHEN PROPERLY EXECUTED AND DELIVERED, THIS PROXY WILL BE 
VOTED IN THE MANNER DIRECTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SHAREHOLDER. IF NO 
DIRECTION IS MADE, THIS PROXY WILL BE VOTED TO ELECT THE THREE 
DIRECTORS, TO RATIFY THE APPOINTMENT OF TANNER LC AND FOR PROPOSALS 
1 AND 2. THIS PROXY WILL BE VOTED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PROXY IF 
OTHER MATTERS PROPERLY COME BEFORE THE MEETING. 
Dated: 
(Signature of Shareholder) 
Dated: 
(Signature of Additional Shareholder, 
if jointly held)— — 
Exact Name(s) of Shareholders(s) 
(Please print) 
Please sign your name exactly as it appears on your stock certificate. A corporation is requested 
to sign its name by its President or other authorized officer, with the office held designated. If 
shares are held jointly, each holder should sign. Executors, trustees, and other fiduciaries 
should so indicate when signing. Please sign, date and return this Proxy immediately. 
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD SIGN AND RETURN 
THIS PROXY PROMPTLY TO : 
COOKIETREE, INC. 
Attention: Harold W. Rosemann 
PO Box 57888 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0888 
PLEASE RETURN BOTH PAGES OF THIS PROXY 
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MINUTES OF THE 2009 ANNUAL MEETING OF 
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF 
COOKIETREE, INC. 
January 6, 2010 
4:00 P.M. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
The 2009 Annual Meeting of die Shareholders of Cookietree Inc., a Utah corporation (the 
"Company"), was held at the above date, time and place in accordance with notice duly provided 
to all of the shareholders of the Company (the "Shareholders") of record on December 18, 2009. 
Greg F. Schenk, the President of the Company, a member of the Company's Board of 
Directors, and the chair of the meeting called the meeting to order. Harold W. Rosemann,, the 
Secretary of the Company, reported that a Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders was duly 
given to all Shareholders of the Company in accordance with the requirements of Utah law and 
the Bylaws of the Company. Said notice, together with a Proxy for the Annual Meeting of 
Shareholders and an Information Statement, were mailed on December 22, 2009 to ail 
Shareholders of record on December 18, 2009 ( the "Record Date")- The Notice of Annual 
Meeting, the Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders, and the Information Statement are 
incorporated in these minutes by reference and are attached hereto. 
The Annual Meeting was convened for the purpose of considering and voting on the 
matters set forth in the Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, the Proxy for Annual Meeting 
of Shareholders, and the Information Statement provided-tathe- Shareholders Mr. Schenk asked— 
Mr. Rosemann to confirm that a sufficient number of the shares of the Common Stock of the 
Company (the "Common Stock") was represented at the meeting, in person or by proxy, to 
constitute a quorum so that the meeting could be duly convened for the transaction of business. 
After reviewing the proxies received and the shares held by the Shareholders in attendance at the 
meeting, Mr. Rosemann announced that of the 4,124,650 shares of the Common Stock issued 
and outstanding on the Record Date, 4,113,400 shares were either represented in person or by 
proxy at the meeting. A majority of the outstanding shares of the Common Stock being 
represented in person or by proxy at the meeting, Mr. Schenk declared a quorum present and the 
Annual Meeting of the Shareholders duly convened for the purpose of transacting business. 
Election of Directors 
Mr. Schenk stated that the first order of business to come before the meeting was the 
election of directors. Mr. Schenk noted that the Company's Board of Directors had nominated 
three persons to serves as directors, namely himself, Harold W. Rosemann and David R. Rudd. 
Mr. Schenk then asked if there were any other nominations. Margaret Olson and Lincoln Hobbs, 
the attorneys and proxies for Sam and Kimberly McLaughlin, respectively nominated Sam and 
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Kimberly McLaughlin to serve on the Board of Directors. Mr. Schenk asked if there were any 
other nominations and there being none, ballots for the election of directors were circulated, 
marked and then tabulated by Mr. Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced the votes to be as 
follows: 3,173,400 votes for each of Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd, 
and 400,000 votes for each of Sam McLaughlin and Kimberly McLaughlin. Mr. Schenk 
announced that Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd had been elected to 
serve on the Company's Board of Directors. 
Approval of Tanner LC 
Mr. Schenk then stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was the 
approval of Tanner LC as the Company's independent auditors for fiscal year 2010 and then 
opened the matter for discussion. Lincoln Hobbs, as proxy for Kimberly McLaughlin, and 
Margaret Olson, as proxy for Sam McLaughlin, both objected to ratifying the appointment of 
Tanner LC. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated, marked, and then tabulated by Mr. 
Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced that 3,173,400 votes were cast in favor of ratifying the 
appointment and 400,000 shares were voted against ratifying the appointment. Mr. Schenk 
announced that based on the vote the Shareholders had: 
RESOLVED, that Tanner LC be approved as the Company's independent 
auditors for fiscal year 2010. 
Shareholder Waiver (Proposal 1) 
Mr. Schenk then stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was 
the proposal (/'Proposal 1") that the Shareholders waive the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the 
stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common 
Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. Mr. 
Schenk then opened the matter for discussion. During the discussion, Margaret Olson and 
Lincoln Hobbs as proxy, respectively for Sam McLaughlin and Kimberly McLaughlin, objected 
to Proposal 1. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated, marked and then tabulated by 
Mr. Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced that 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of Proposal 
1 and 400,000 shares were voted against Proposal I (the 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of 
the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999 were not voted). 
Mr. Rosemann also reported that of the "qualified shares" of the Common Stock held by the 
Shareholders present or represented by proxy at the meeting, 987,000 "qualified shares'' were 
voted in favor of Proposal 1 and 400,000 "qualified shares" were voted against Proposal 1. Mr. 
Schenk announced that based on the vote the Shareholders had: 
RESOLVED, that the Shareholders hereby waive the provisions of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' 
Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to 
the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk 
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to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. 
Shareholder Ratification (Proposal 2) 
Mr. Schenk stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was the 
proposal ("Proposal 2") that the Shareholders who hold "qualified shares" ratify (1) the waiver 
by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the provisions of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the Shareholders of the Company, as 
contemplated by Proposal 1, of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the 
extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions 
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company 
by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. Mr. Schenk then opened the 
matter for discussion. Margaret Olson and Lincoln Hobbs as proxy, respectively for Sam and 
Kimberly McLaughlin objected to Proposal 2. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated, 
marked and then tabulated by Mr. Rosemann. It was noted that Greg Schenk did not vote on 
Proposal 2. Mr. Rosemann announced that of the "qualified shares" of the Common Stock held 
by the Shareholders present or represented by proxy at the meeting, 987,000 "qualified shatres" 
were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400.000 "qualified shares" were voted against Proposal 2. 
Mr. Schenk announced that the based on the vote the Shareholders holding "qualified shades" 
had: 
RESOLVED, that the Shareholders hereby ratify (1) the waiver by the 
Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the provisions of the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the Shareholders of the 
Company as contemplated by Proposal I of the provisions of ihe 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders1 
Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to 
the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk 
to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. 
After voting on the matters before the meeting, Mr. Schenk led a general discussion of 
the business and provided an overview of the state of the Company. He noted the tremendous 
revenue and net income growth the Company has experienced over the last five years. He also 
noted that the outlook for 2010 is very positive. 
There being no further business to come before the meeting, the meeting was adjourned 
at 4:30 p.m. 
Harold W. Rosemann \ 
Secretary 
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Attachments: 
Notice of Annual Meeting, 
Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 
and Information Statement 
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COOKIETREB, INC, 
Annual Meeting of Shareholders 
January 6, 2010 
CERTIFICATE AND REPORT OF 
INSPECTOR OF ELECTION/VOTING JUDGE 
I; the undersigned, having been duly appointed 
Inspector of Election/Voting Judge for the Annual Meeting of the 
Shareholders of Cookietree, Inc. (the "Company") held on January 
6, 2010 (the "Meeting'*) , do hereby report: 
1. I executed my oath of office and duly delivered 
the same to the Chairman of the Meeting. 
2. I inspected the shareholders' list prepared by the 
Company with respect to the Meeting, and I certify that the 
number of the shares of the Common Stock of the Company (the 
"Common Stock") issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the 
Meeting was 4,124,650. 
3. I recorded the Shareholders of the Company (the 
"Shareholders') present at the Meeting, in person or by proxy, 
and the number of the shares of the Common Stock owned by them 
and I certify that there were present at such meeting, in person 
or by proxy, Shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the Common 
Stock. 
4. I tallied the number of the shares of the Common 
Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person 
or by proxy, on the matter of the election of directors of the 
Company and I certify that Shareholders present at the Meeting 
voted shares of the Common Stock held by them HForM or "Against," 
che election of directors as set forth below or abstained from 
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voting also as set forth below: 
Nominee For Against Abstained 
Greg F. Schenk 3,173,400 
David R. Rudd 3,173,400 
Harold W. Rosemann 3,173,400 
Sam McLaughlin 400,000 
Kim McLaughlin 400,000 
5. I tallied the number of the shares of the Common 
Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person 
or by proxy, on the matter of the ratification of the selection 
of Tanner LC as independent accountants to audit the financial 
statements of the Company for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 2010 and I certify that Shareholders present at the Meeting 
voted 3,713,400 shares of the Common Stock held by them "For" and 
400,000 shares of the Common Stock held by them "Against, " the 
ratification of Tanner LC as independent accountants to audit the 
financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2010 and no Shareholders abstained from voting. 
6. I tallied the number of the shares of the Common 
Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person 
or by proxy, on the proposal (Proposal 1) to waive the provisions 
of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and, to the extent 
applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the 
stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale 
of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna 
Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999 and I certify 
that (i) Shareholders present at the Meeting voted 3,168,200 
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shares of the Common Stock held by them (the 545,200 shares of 
the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk 
that occurred in August 1999 were not voted) "For* and 400,000 
shares of the Common Stock held by them ^Against" the proposal 
and no Shareholders abstained from voting on the proposal; and 
(ii) Shareholders present at the Meeting voted 987,000 Hqualified 
shares" of the Common Stock held by them "For" and 400,000 
"qualified shares" of the Common Stock held by them "Against" the 
proposal and no Shareholders owning "qualified shares" abstained 
from voting on the proposal. 
7. I tallied the number of the shares of the Common 
Stock voted by Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person or 
by proxy, on the proposal (Proposal 2) to ratify (1) the waiver 
by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the 
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the 
present waiver by the Shareholders of the Company as contemplated 
by Proposal 1 of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement and, to the extent applicable, of the 1999 
Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions 
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the 
Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that 
occurred in August 1999 and I certify that Shareholders present 
at the Meeting voted 987,000 "qualified shares" of the Common 
Stock held by them "For" and 400,000 "qualified shares" of the 
Common Stock held by them "Against" the proposal and no 
Shareholders owning "qualified shares" abstained from voting on 
the proposal. I certify that Greg Schenk abstained from voting 
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on this proposal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have made and signed this 
Certificate and Report this 6th day of January 2010. 
<^^^rf<v^ 
Harold W. Rosema; sr 
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